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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-2a-3{2X_b).
ISSUES
I.

Did the trial court err in awarding petitioner alimony in an amount

creating a disparate standard of living and contrary to the evidence regarding petitioner's
need and respondent's ability to pay? [Issue preserved in R. 343-76; 416-87; 501-31; 54045; 546-57; 752-53; 764-65.]
Standard of Review: This Court reviews the trial court's findings of fact in
an award of alimony for abuse of discretion. Bakanowski v. Bakanowski. 2003 UT App
357, ^[7, 80 P.3d 153. '"Failure to consider these factors constitutes an abuse of
discretion,' resulting in reversal 'unless pertinent facts in the record are clear,
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor or judgment.'" Rehn v.
Rehn, 1999 UT App 41, ^6, 974 P.2d 306. With respect to a trial court's conclusions of
law. this Court reviews an alimony award for correctness, according no deference to the
trial court. Davis v. Dayigr 2003 UT App 282f fl, 76 P.3d 716.
II.

Was the trial court's failure to follow Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 in

making its alimony award in error? [Issue preserved in R. 343-76; 416-87; 501-31; 54045; 546-57; 752-53; 764-65-1

Standard of Review: With respect to a trial court's conclusions of law, this
Court reviews an alimony award for correctness, according no deference to the trial court.
Davis v. Davis. 2003 UT App 282,1[7, 76 P.3d 716.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES.
ORDINANCES. RULES AND REGULATIONS
(8)(a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requinng
support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated
by the payor spouse; and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the
payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the
payor spouse to attend school during the marriage.
v* * *
(c)
As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the
time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a).
However, the court should consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in
its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial. . . .
(d)
The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parites*
respective standards of living.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8) (2003).

*>

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is on appeal from a bench trial held in August of 2003. At trial,
the parties introduced evidence on the issues of alimony and property distribution. Only
the trial court's ruling with respect to alimony is part of this appeal. Following trial, the
parties' submitted proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The trial court
entered a preliminary Memorandum Decision with its ruling based on the parties'
submission. Thereafter, respondent filed post-trial motions for a new trial and to amend
the findings. The trial court entered a subsequent written ruling, denying most of
respondent's requested relief and adopting most of petitioner's proposed findings.
Ultimately, a final set of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a
final Decree of Divorce were entered. From the final decree, respondent timely appealed
the trial court's alimony award.
//
//
//
//
//
//
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STATEMENT OF FACTS1
The parties were married on May 15, 1979. (Tr. at 6.) On April 18, 2001,
the parties separated when petitioner decided to leave the marital home in order to move
to Washington to teach. Anna was 15 years old and Andrea was 19 years old and both
were living at home with the respondent. (Tr. at 26, 117.) Shortly thereafter, petitioner
filed for divorce on June 25, 2001. (Tr. at 26.) At the time of trial in August, 2003,
respondent was 49 (d/o/b 12/11/53) and petitioner was 50 (d/o/b 7/23/53). (Tr. at 5.) The
parties had two children, Andrea, 22, (d/o/b 11/13/80), and Anna, 17, (d/o/b 1/29/86) at
the time of trial. (Tr. at 5-6.) At the time the parties separated, both children still lived at
home (Tr. At 117); at the time of trial, the youngest, Anna, was entering her senior year of
high school and expected to graduate in June, 2004 (Tr. at 7-9). During the marriage and
after moving from the parties' home, petitioner's relationship with the children
deteriorated, and respondent remained with the children in the marital home.
'Respondent challenges the trial court's alimony determination on three grounds:
(1) as a matter of law, (2) as unsupported by sufficient findings, and (3) as unsupported
by evidence at tnal. In order to challenge the trial court's factual findings and insufficient
findings, respondent must marshal the evidence at trial and the tnal court's factual
findings. In order to fulfill this obligation, respondent has summarized the evidence at
tnal that pertained to the alimony award with cites to the transcript, denoted by a cite
beginning with "Tr.", whereas all cites to the record are denoted by "R." For the most
part, however, respondent believes the alimony award is legal error for failure to comply
with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 and case law interpreting those
statutory requirements.
4

The parties met while working together at Schovaers Electronics in 1978.
(Tr. at 11 ) Schovaers Electronics is family owned business which manufactures circuit
boards for use in computers and electronic devices. The company was started by
respondent's father in 1977. All stock is owned by members of the Schovaers family. (Tr.
at 10-11.) At the time of marriage, respondent was Vice President of Schovaers
Electronics and ran the manufacturing side of the business. (Tr. at 14.) At the time of
trial, respondent was still Vice President. (Tr. at 16.)
Throughout much of the marriage, respondent worked from 7:00 a.m. until
about 5:00 p.m. at the family business For his work, respondent received a salary, (Tr. at
16-17.) At the time of trial, respondent had worked at Schovaers Electronics for 26 years
and often worked as many as 60 to 70 hours a week. (Tr. at 17, 119.)
When the parties separated, the children remained with respondent in the
marital home. Because petitioner no longer shared in the responsibilities of rasing the
parties' children, respondent had to decrease his hours to 40-50 per week and was
required to take a pay cut because of the decreased hours, (Tr. at 119-123.) Although
one child was over 18 and the youngest child would reach the age of emancipation shortly
after the trial in the fall of 2003, respondent did not believe he could return to the 60-70
hour work week if he wanted to do so. Specifically, respondent testified that because of a
5

decrease in demand due to increased foreign competition, the family business did not
have sufficient work to allow him to work 60-70 hours a week. (Tr. at 125.)
The only testimony offered indicated Schovaers Electronics1 business has
gone down. (Tr. at 122.) In 1999, Schovaer's Electronics lost $14,000. (Tr. at 123, Ex.
49.) In 2000, the business lost $23,400. (Tr. at 124; Ex. 50.) In 2001, the business lost
$20,500 (Tr. at 124; Ex. 51.) For the last half of 2002 and first 3 months of 2003,
Schovaers Electronics has lost $7,900 (Ex. 52-53; Tr. at 124.) Additionally, respondent
still spends significant amounts of time raising the children since petitioner moved to
Washington in August pf 2002. (Tr. at 125.)
Respondent's Income as Ability to Pay:
Shortly before the parties' separation, respondent's salary from Schovaers
Electronics peaked at approximately $5700 per month gross. (Tr. at 29-31.) After
separation when respondent decreased his hours in order to raise the children, his salary
decreased to $4,300 per month gross. (Tr. at 31-2, 67-68, 119-121; Ex. 41.) The testimony
offered to support respondent's decrease in hours and corresponding reduction in pay was
that his increased responsibilities at home were the cause, testimony which petitioner did
not refute. (Tr. at 31-2, 67-68,119-121; Ex. 41.) Dunng the marriage, respondent

6

received only sporadic bonuses, with the largest bonus being received one month after the
parties' marriage in 1979 for $30,000. (Tr. at 34-35.)
In addition to the sporadic bonuses which were infrequently paid,
respondent occasionally received gifts from his parents. (Tr. at 45.) The gifts to
respondent were as high as $10,000, but most were substantially lower with a few for
$5,000 (Tr. at 46) or as little as $500 (Tr. at 46). After separation and after respondent's
salary had decreased, respondent received occasional gifts from parents. (Tr. at 46.) In
December, 2002, respondent received Christmas gift of $5,000. (Tr. at 46; Ex. 43.)
During the marriage, the parties'joint gross income figures for 1998 (Ex.
36) and 1999 (Ex. 35), were $93,056 (Tr. at 52-53) and $98,830 (Tr. at 53); joint mcome
for 2000 was $93,596 (Tr. at 53), From 1998 through separation, the combined income
was roughly $94,000 per year (Tr. at 56.) Prior to that time, the parties' combined
income was lower. (Tr. at 56 )
In 2001, the parties filed separately and respondent's income was $57,077.
(Tr. at 54.) In 2002 (Ex. 38), respondent's income was 70,000. (Tr. at 56.) At the time of
trial, respondent's salary was $51,600, or $4,300 gross per month with no anticipated
increase (Tr. at 172); his net income after taxes was $3,400 (Tr. at 172; Ex. 23).
Respondent receives a net check of $1,700 twice per month. (Tr. at 173; Ex. 25.)
7

Petitioner's Tncome:
Prior to the parties1 marriage in 1979, petitioner worked at Schovaers
Electronics as a silk screener. (Tr. at 108.) She also worked at Schmidt Signs as a silkscreener. (Tr. at 110.) About 9 months after marriage, petitioner stopped working at
Schovaers Electronics by mutual agreement. (Tr. at 108-09.) Petitioner was pregnant and
the parties' first child was born in November, 1980. (Tr. at 109-10.) Between 1980 and
1997, petitioner did not work and stayed at home to care for the parties1 children. (Tr. at
111.)
In about 1991, petitioner decided to go back to school and she used
inherited money and marital assets to pay for college. (Tr. at 112, 208.) Petitioner
obtained a teaching certificate from Westminster College. (Tr. at 112.) Petitioner started
working for Granite School District in January, 199S (Tr. at 113) and then went to Jordan
School District after one year at Granite (Tr. at 113, 208-9). Petitioner worked full time
initially, but was offered history classes rather than the art classes she wanted to teach, so
she switched to part-time at Jordan. (Tr. at 113-114,209-11.)
With respect to the decision to teach part time, petitioner voluntarily
stopped teaching history because she only wanted to teach art classes at Jordan. (Tr. at
270-274.) Shortly before the parties separated, petitioner voluntarily resigned from
8

teaching at Jordan. (Tr. at 274-75.) Additionally, petitioner sent a letter to the Jordan
district withdrawing her name from any future teaching positions, indicating she could not
accept a position in the school district because she was moving to Washington. (Tr. at
275-280.)
In Washington, petitioner works 25 hours per week at the Bon Marche* (a
permanent position) and also as a substitute teacher at Everett School District. (Tr. at
214.) At the Bon Marche\ petitioner receives $11/hour and works about 25 hours a week,
which equals about $1,188 per month. (Tr. at 215, Ex. 85.) Since the beginning of 2003
through trial in August, 2003, petitioner substitute taught 7-8 times, for which she
received $1,035, or about $130 monthly. (Tr. at 217-19; Ex. 87.) Since moving to
Washington, petitioner has applied to various school districts, but has not received any
teaching offers. (Tr. at 222-227.) Also, petitioner has applied for other jobs, but has
received no offers. Her current salary, combining her work at the Bon Marche' and
substitute teaching, is $1,310 per month. (Tr. at 227-30.) Although petitioner has not
found the teaching positions she hoped for in Washington, she is not considering moving
back to Utah, even though the job prospects in Washington are bleak. (Tr. at 280-81.)
In 1999, petitioners income was $20,000 (Tr. at 54); and in 2000, her
income was $14,000 (Tr. at 54-55). At Jordan district, petitioner received $24,022 in
9

2001 (Tr. at 220; Ex. 81); in 2002, she received $18,525 (Tr. at 220; Ex. 82). Petitionees
income in 2002 was from both part-time teaching and working at the Bon and May stores.
(Tr. at220.)
Had petitioner remained in Utah and remained at Jordan school district she
could have earned at least $28,000 per year; the Jordan district pay scale of teachers who
have been teaching for five years is $28,000. (Tr. at 282; Ex. 99.) Although petitioner
testified she did not like teaching history and was not certified to teach history, petitioner
acknowledged she could accept a position teaching history as long as she took concurrent
classes to get the required endorsement. (Tr. at 293-95.)
Respondent's Monthly Expenses:
With respect to respondent's monthly expenses, most of the figures were
offered in the form of exhibits introduced at trial. (Tr. at 174, 185-90; Exs. 26, 91.)
Exhibit 26 was the summary prepared by respondent, whereas exhibit 91 was a summary
of respondent's expenses prepared by petitioner. (Tr, at 174, 185-90; Exs. 26, 91.)
Ultimately, the trial court lowered several of Respondent's claimed expenses as excessive
and determined his reasonable monthly expenses were $2,187 per month. (R. at 336-337;
745-47; 807-810.)
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Petitioner's Needs and Monthly Expenses:
During trial, the testimony regarding petitioner's expenses focused mainly
on her standard of living after separation as compared to during the marriage. (Tr. at 25966.) Much of this testimony, however, was inadmissible. (Tr. at 262-64.) Petitioner
requested alimony to match the standard of living enjoyed during marriage, which she
estimated required $2500 per month. (Tr. at 259-66.) Similar to respondent's testimony,
most of petitioner's testimony regarding her monthly expenses occurred through exhibits.
(Tr. at 230, 287-90, Exs. 34, 98.) Exhibit 98 was petitioner's prepared summary of her
expenses and exhibit 34 was an earlier financial declaration. (Tr. at 230, 287-290; Exs.
34, 98.) Ultimately, the trial court adopted petitioner's exhibit 98 as reflective of her
reasonable monthly expenses. (R. at 805.)
Schovaers Electronics Stock:
At the time of trial, respondent owned 116 shares of Schovaers Electronics
stock. (Tr. at 62.) Respondent received these shares as gifts from his parents over a ten
year period (Tr. at 63; Ex. 47-48.) The stock was gifted at six different dates, with his
parents fixing values to the stock at each date. (Tr. at 64, Ex. 47-48.) The first gift was for
35 shares, valued at $16,873 per share as of March, 1985. (Tr. at 68.) On September 30,
1988, respondent received another 34 shares, valued at the time at $584 per share. (Tr. at
11

69.) On December 16, 1991, respondent received another 13 shares, valued at $1,491 per
share. (Tr. at 69.) In April, 1992, respondent acquired another 13 shares, valued at $1,503
per share. (Tr. at 69.) On October 15, 1993, respondent received 12 shares, valued at
$1,663 per share, and on December 22, 1995, he received 9 shares, valued at $2,124 per
share. (Tr. at 70.) Currently, respondent owns 116 shares (Tr. at 73) or 11.6 percent of
Schovaers Electronics (Tr. at 71, 144-45).
John has five siblings (Tr. at 71-2): Bob who also ownsl 16 shares (Tr. at
73), Mary Jane who owns 40 shares (Tr. at 73), Susan who owns 40 shares (Tr. at 74),
Judy who owns 116 shares (Tr. at 73), and Barabara who owns 48 shares (Tr. at 73).
When the shares were gifted from the parents to the children, the parents made no
indication that the shares were a form of compensation or tied to employment. (Tr. at 74.)
During trial, respondent objected to petitioner's attempt to fix values to the
shares, which objection was sustained by the trial court. (Tr. at 68.) Specifically,
petitioner attempted to elicit testimony fixing the value of respondent's 116 shares at least
to $2124 per share. Respondent objected to this attempt to value the shares and the
objection was sustained. (Tr. at 79, 80 ) Respondent testified the shares were not a marital
asset and indicated he had an expert to testify as to the value of the stock. (Tr. at 80-83.)
The trial court indicated that, absent other foundation and testimony that the shares were a
12

marital asset, it did not need any further evidence as to value because the stock was not a
marital asset which needed to be valued. (Tr. at 82-83.) Although petitioner testified that
she believed the value of the stock was $800,000 and that she owned an interest, the trial
court never requested further testimony as to the present value of the shares, nor was any
evidence as to present value offered. (Tr. at 68, 79-83, 239-241, 247-48.) Finally, no
testimony was offered that the shares had any capacity to produce income.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in awarding
petitioner alimony of $2,000 per month. The trial court's award was motivated by its
perception that the parties' post-separation lifestyles were skewed in respondent's favor.
Accordingly, the trial court awarded alimony m an attempt to "equalize" the parties'
standards of living. As the rulings and evidence indicate, however, the alimony award
was excessive and not based on the evidence presented. Thus, the result was to provide
petitioner far more income than she needed to meet her monthly expenses and to cause
respondent to be unable to meet his expenses.
The undisputed facts indicate respondent's take home pay is $3,400 per
month. Indeed, the trial court specifically rejected petitioner's attempt to use a higher
historical income figure. Nevertheless, the trial court ordered respondent to pay well over
13

half of his take home pay as alimony. The result is that respondent is left with $1,400 per
month to meet his living expenses, which the court lowered to $2,187. Meanwhile,
petitioner receives far more than her demonstrated need. As such, the alimony award is
an abuse of discretion and should be reversed on appeal.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Trial Court Erred in Awarding Petitioner Alimony of $2000 Per
Month Where the Award Is Not Supported By Adequate Findings, Is
Not Supported By Evidence and Is Not Legally Correct.
A.

The Trial Court Did Not Make Adequate Findings.

The trial court's findings are inconsistent with the evidence presented at trial
and are insufficient to support an alimony award of $2000 per month. The trial court
made the following findings: the trial court determined respondent's gross monthly
income is $4,300 per month (R. at 333, 746, 794, f 19); at the time of trial, petitioner's
gross monthly income was $1,380.00 per month (R. at 745, 795, f24) and the court
imputed income to her of $1,649.00 per month (R. at 745, 796, |30); the trial court
lowered respondent's claimed monthly expenses to $2,189.00 per month (R. at 807-10,
ffl|96-97), and finally, the trial court made no findings as to petitioner's reasonable
monthly expenses, except to adopt by reference an exhibit with her claimed monthly
expenses (R. at 791-813).
14

In making an alimony award, the trial court is required to make findings for
each of the statutory factors set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5; i.e., the needs of the
recipient spouse; the earning capacity of the recipient spouse; the ability of the obligor
spouse to provide support; and, the length of the marriage. See Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 UT
App 41, 1(6, 974 P.2d 306. The failure to make these findings constitutes an abuse of
discretion and is reversible error. Simply making these findings, however, is not
necessarily sufficient. "[T]he tnal court must make detailed findings on all material
issues, i.e. the Jones|2] factors, which 'should . . . include enough subsidiary facts to
disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.'"
I d (quoting Stevens v. Stevens. 754 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)). Respondent
challenges the trial court's determinations regarding his ability to pay and petitioner's
need.
i.

Respondent's Ability to Pay,

As to Respondent's ability to pay, the trial court is required to make specific
findings: "'simply stating [the obligor's] earnings does not amount to an adequate finding
of fact as to his ability to provide support. To be sufficient, the findings should also

2

Jones v. Jones. 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985).
15

address [the obligor's] needs and expenditures, such as housing, payment of debts, and
other living expenses/" Rehn, 1999 UT App 41 at ^[10 (quoting Baker, 866 P.2d at 547).
The fatal flaw in the trial court's determination of respondent's ability to
pay can be traced through the trial court's post-trial rulings which culminated in the final
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The only issue as to respondent's income
concerned his voluntary reduction in hours and corresponding decrease in pay. During
the trial, respondent was questioned regarding the reduction in his hours after the parties'
separation. (Tr. at pp. 17, 119-123, 125, 205-06.) Although petitioner presented
evidence that respondent's hours worked and income decreased at the time of separation,
the credible evidence presented justified respondent's decreased hours. Specifically,
respondent's work time decreased from between 60-7u hours per week to approximately
40-50 hours per week by necessity. (Tr. at pp. 17, 119-123, 125, 205-06.) Petitioner had
traditionally cared for the parties' children, but at separation, petitioner voluntarily moved
out of the marital home, stopped caring for the parties' children and indicated she was
moving to Washington. (Tr. at 117, 119-23, 277-81.) Consequently, respondent was
forced to decrease his hours in order to provide care for the children. (Tr. at 119-23.)
Additionally, since separation, respondent offered unrefuted testimony that
his family's electronic business had experienced a downturn in demand. (Tr. at 119-23,
16

125.) Even if respondent did not have to decrease his hours to care for the children, the
evidence indicated the family electronic business did not have enough work to sustain
respondent at the same workload as during the marriage. (Tr. at 119-23, 125.)
After trial, the court ordered both parties to submit proposed findings for
the court's consideration. Petitioner submitted her proposed findings and included
findings which indicated respondent was voluntarily underemployed. (R. at 334.) In the
first post-trial Memorandum Decision dated October 31, 2003, the trial court rejected
petitioner's findings which suggested respondent was underemployed. (R. at 334.)
Specifically, the trial court stated:
The petitioner is to amend Finding of Fact No. 20 and
delete Finding No. 21 to reflect that the respondent's pay was
reduced from approximately $6,000 per month to $4,300 per
month (gross) because of a reduction in work hours
necessitated by his having to assume all of the parenting and
household responsibilities. In other words, both Findings
imply that the respondent was earning less than he was
capable of. The testimony does not bear this out and the
Court makes no such Findings.
(R at 334, f 1 (Emphasis Added.)) Accordingly, the trial court unequivocally found that
respondent was not underemployed. Thus, the trial court's alimony award was based on
respondent's current income of $4,300 gross per month. (R. at 794, TJ19.) After taxes,
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respondent's net take home pay is $3,400 per month. Once the alimony obligation is
deducted, respondent is left with only $1,400 to meet his monthly expenses.
The second component of respondent's ability to pay requires consideration
of respondent's own monthly expenses. In reviewing respondent's claimed expenses, the
tnal court substantially lowered respondent's claimed expenses and found his reasonable
monthly expenses were $2,189. Accordingly, after paying his alimony obligation,
respondent is left with a monthly shortfall of almost $800. In contrast, petitioner receives
$2,000 per month plus her actual earned income of $1,380 (notwithstanding the fact that
the trial court imputed income of $ 1,649 per month) Thus, petitioner has $3,3 80 per
month to live on3, and respondent has $1,400. The tnal court's alimony award does not
equalize the parties income, but rather results in a major discrepancy in petitioner's favor.
As such, the trial court's alimony award was in error and an abuse of discretion.
Respondent did not decrease his hours to an unreasonably low amount, nor
did his compensation decrease to unusually low level. The Utah Supreme Court has
previously determined that a spouse whose hours decreased to 50 hours per week and
who was still adequately compensated by the family business was not voluntarily

3

Of course, the $3,380 is a gross figure. Nevertheless, after taxes are taken out,
petitioner's net take home is about double what respondent has to live on after he pays
alimony.
18

underemployed. See Griffith v. Griffith. 1999 UT 78, f l 8 , 985 P.2d 255. Additionally,
this Court previously found a husband's decision to stop working in order to care for the
children and because of age related issues was reasonable and not grounds for a
determination of voluntary underemployment. See Endrody v. Endrody, 914 P.2d 1166,
1170 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Moreover, the trial court found respondent's testimony
credible on the reduction in pay and declined petitioner's invitation to base alimony on
respondent's historic income. (R. at 334.) Absent the required findings and considering
the evidence presented at trial to support respondent's decision to decrease his hours from
60-70 to 40-50 hours per week, no basis exists to conclude respondent is voluntarily
underemployed or could receive more compensation for his work even if he decided to
return to 60-70 hours per week.
Although respondent decreased his hours at work after the parties separated,
it is undisputed respondent continues to maintain full time employment of approximately
40 to 50 hours per week. (Tr. at pp. 17, 119-123, 125, 205-06.) With the 10 to 20 hour a
week decrease, respondent's income decreased from approximately $72,000 per year to
$51,600 at the time of trial. (R. at 794-95, ffl|19, 21.) After taxes, respondents net take
home pay is $3,400. (Tr. at 172-73; Ex. 23, 25.) From that $3,400, the trial court ordered
respondent to pay $2000 per month in order to "equalize" incomes. The trial court's
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alimony order has the effect of leaving respondent $1,400 per month to live on, while
petitioner receives $3,380 per month in gross income ($2,000 + $1,380 (actual income,
not imputed income) = $3,380). Even after taxes are figured into petitioner's income,
petitioner's net monthly income is substantially higher than respondent's. After factoring
in petitioner's claimed monthly expenses of $1743 and taxes, petitioner is left with
approximately $1,000 per month in discretionary income. On the other hand, respondent
is left with an $800 shortfall.
The trial court's alimony award is based on respondent's gross take home
pay of $4,300 per month. After taxes and alimony, respondent does not have enough
money to meet his basic monthly expenses. An alimony award which fails to account for
respondent's ability to pay is an abuse of discretion and fails as a matter of law. Because
the trial court ordered respondent to pay more than he could afford, the alimony award
cannot be sustained as a matter of law.
ii.

Petitioner's Need.

The trial court abused its discretion by failing to make any detailed findings
as to petitioner's actual need for alimony to meet her monthly expenses. Addressing need,
this Court has stated: "As to the first factor, we stated in Baker that a trial court may not
"merely restate [the recipient spouse's] testimony [regarding] her monthly
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expenses

'" Rehn, 1999 UT App 41 at f 7 (quoting Baker v. Baker. 866 P.2d 540, 546

(Utah Ct. App. 1993)). In other words, Rehn, Baker and Stevens require the trial court to
independently assess petitioner's stated expenses, evaluate them in light of the evidence
produced, make detailed factual findings which disclose the trial court's consideration of
the evidence and the steps used to reach the findings and to set forth the findings without
simply restating petitioner's testimony. As the evidence and findings indicate, the trial
court failed to meet this standard. Specifically, the trial court violated the mandate in
Rehn by making no independent findings and merely adopting wholesale petitioner's
stated need.
The trial court made no specific findings as to petitioner's actual needs.
Instead, the trial court made the following observations: (1) since separation, petitioner
has not been able to maintain the standard of living the parties enjoyed while married; (2)
since separation, petitioner has lived a "spartan" existence; and (3) since separation,
petitioner has had to cut back on her discretionary spending. (R. at 805-06, ffl[89-93.)
These general observations are not sufficient to replace the specific findings required by
Utah law.
When coupled with the trial court's erroneous determination of respondent's
ability to pay, the trial court's deficient findings as to petitioner's need result in an
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unsupportable alimony award. In this case, the trial court made no findings as to what
petitionees actual demonstrated need is. The only finding which remotely addresses
petitionees expenses is paragraph 90, which provides: MThe amounts that Ms. Schovaers
current [sic] claims to be spending for basic necessary living expenses are set forth in
Exhibit #98." (R at 805, f90.) Exhibit #98 lists petitioner's monthly expenses as $1,743
per month. Instead of a specific finding, the trial court made general observations that
petitioner needed alimony in order to raise her standard of living to a level comparable to
that of respondent's. Those findings, however, are insufficient. As Utah law indicates,
the trial court needed to make an actual determination of petitioner's unmet need for
purposes of calculating an appropriate award. Without this finding, the alimony award
provides petitioner income well in excess of her actual need while causing the respondent
at least an $800 shortfall.
With respect to the substantial alimony award, the trial court's award
appears to be premised on equalizing income and restoring petitioner to the standard of
living she enjoyed while the parties were married. The trial court's early rulings were all
based on the perception that respondent enjoyed a supenor lifestyle and petitioner's
lifestyle was meager. (R. at 336-37, 745-47.) The trial court's post trial rulings and
ultimate Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, however, fail to articulate what
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petitioner's actual expenses and/or need is for alimony. (R. at 333-339, 742-4Q,791821A.)
Based on the only findings made by the trial court as to petitioner's
expenses compared with her income, the petitioner's unmet need would be $1,743 $1,649 (imputed income) = $94. If petitioner's actual monthly income is used, rather than
the imputed income, her unmet need is still only $363 per month ($1,743 - $1,380).
Either figure is a far cry from the $2,000 alimony award made by the trial court.
It is undisputed that the parties' income since separation has decreased-by
virtue of petitioner's voluntary underemployment and respondent's decrease in income as
a result of caring for the parties' children and slow down in his family's business-while
the parties' expenses have increased by virtue of the necessity of maintaining two
residences. The testimony indicates that at its height during the marriage the parties' joint
income did not exceed $92,000.00 gross per year. (R. at 795-96, 804,1fl(21, 27, 86.) With
the alimony award and imputed mcome, petitioner's gross income is approximately half of
the parties1 highest yearly income during the marriage, which is $46,000. (R. at 811,
Tfl06.) The evidence and findings demonstrate that the parties no longer earn $92,000 per
year, nor are they capable of earning that amount. In fact, not taking into account the
income imputed to petitioner, the parties current joint income is $68,160 ($51,600 +
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$16,560 = $68,160). Accordingly, with the alimony award, petitioner receives roughly
2/3 of the parties' combined gross income. (R. at 811.)
Notwithstanding the trial court's attempt to equalize income, the trial court
made no findings as to petitioner's actual need as required by Utah Code Ann § 30-3-5.
As set forth above, the trial court only made findings as to the parties' standard of living
during the marriage. This is not sufficient. Moreover, these findings are especially
deficient in this case where the parties' historic income levels do not support an equalized
alimony award. Equalization is typically appropriate in cases where the payor spouse's
income is substantially higher than the recipient spouse's income and also substantially
higher than the payor spouse's need. In that circumstance where the payor spouse has
substantial discretionary income, it may be appropriate to equalize the parties' income to
lessen the disparity and provide lifestyles more consistent with that dunng the parties'
marriage.
The evidence in this case does not support an award of alimony to equalize
the parties' income. Although the parties enjoyed a comfortable lifestyle during marriage,
it cannot be said that the parties had substantial amounts of discretionary income. After
separation, both parties' incomes decreased while the parties' combined expenses
increased. Quite simply, neither party is able to enjoy the standard of living they had
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during the marriage. An alimony award based on no findings as to the recipient spouse's
actual need is not appropriate. Because the trial court did not make the required finding
of petitionees actual need, the alimony award is an abuse of discretion and reversible
error as a matter of law.
Hi.

Income from Other Sources.

Finally, the trial court made no findings to support a conclusion that
respondent had income from other sources which would assist in his ability to pay. (R. at
810.) The trial court made a finding which indicated that it was awarding respondent all
of the stock in the family's electronics business as his separate property. (R. at SOL K1f5657.) The trial court, however, made no findings as to how this stock would supplement
respondent's income. (R. at 747, 800-01, 810.) Indeed, no evidence was presented to
suggest the shares produced any income or dividend. (Tr. at 63-74, 80-83, 239-41, 247284.) In fact, no evidence was presented as to the actual value of the shares. (Tr. at 7983.) Petitioner did introduce evidence as to the value respondent's parents fixed to the
shares at various points in time, but that evidence was inadmissible. (Tr. at 79-83.)
Petitioner, however, offered no evidence to show a current value for the shares. (Tr. at
79-83 )
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On the other hand, Respondent offered testimony and argument which
indicated the value of the shares was minimal. (Tr. at 79-83, 239-41, 247-48 ) Indeed,
respondent offered to provide expert testimony regarding the value of the shares. The
trial court, however, declined this invitation because she indicated she was inclined to
rule the stock was not a marital asset. (Tr. at 79-83.) In the Findings of Fact, the trial
court's only statement on income from the shares of stock is as follows: "Furthermore,
Mr. Schovaers* ability to pay alimony of at least $2,000 per month is bolstered by the fact
that the Court is awarding Mr. Schovaers all of the Schovaers Electronics stock which is
worth hundreds of thousands of dollars. Thus, Mr. Shovaers clearly has the financial
ability and resources to pay alimony of a least $2,000 per month." (R. at 810, ^f 100.)
This unsupported factual finding is simply an insufficient basis upon which
to determine respondent has additional income to pay alimony. The stock is issued from a
closely held family business. The stock has little value to persons outside the family and
is, by the terms of the gift from the parents, non-transferable. Furthermore, the stock has
never paid a dividend or generated any income stream.
In addition to not generating any income, an alimony award premised on the
use or sale of a non-marital asset is inappropnate. In certain circumstances, alimony may
be enhanced because the obligor spouse is awarded an asset which enhances the spouse's
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earning capacity. See, e.g., Sorensen v. Sorensen, 839 P.2d 774, 776 (Utah 1992)
(finding husband's dental practice was not a marital asset but noting the alimony award
was enhanced due to the amount husband earned as income from the practice); see also
Petersen v. Petersen. 737 P.2d 237, 242 (Utah Ct. App. 1^87). In those cases, however,
the asset enhances the obligor spouse's income and therefore increases the spouse's ability
to pay. In this case, the asset does nothing to enhance respondent's income. To the extent
the alimony award contemplates he could sell the stock to pay alimony, the award is
legally flawed because no Utah case has held a spouse should sell a non-marital asset in
order to pay alimony, which is not otherwise sustainable based on that spouse's actual
earning capacity. In effect, an alimony award premised on sale of an asset would be a
property distribution rather than alimony. Since the court has determined the stock is not
a marital asset, the backdoor property distribution through heightened alimony amounts to
legal error.
B.

Given the Lack of Findings to Support the Award and Flawed
Reasoning, the Trial Court Erred When It Arrhed at an Award
Which Created a Disparate Standard of Living.

The tnal court committed legal error when it awarded petitioner alimony of
$2000 per month when respondent has no ability to pay this amount and petitioner has no
demonstrated need for this amount. In this case, the tnal court appeared to simply attempt
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to equalize the parties1 incomes, which it ultimately failed to do. The failure of the trial
court to consider the statutory factors and instead to equalize income was error. See
Bakanowski v. Bakanowski. 2003 UT App 357,^[12, 80 P.3d 153. Indeed this Court has
indicated a trial court should not award a spouse more than her established need
"regardless of the [payor spouse's] ability to pay" that amount, and "the spouse's
demonstrated need must, under Jones, constitute the maximum permissible alimony
award." Id.
For the reasons set forth above, the trial court's alimony award is legally
flawed in failing to consider the required statutory factors. Additionally, assuming the
statutory factors were considered and the findings sufficient, the award cannot be
sustained because it legally incorrect. The alimony award creates a large discrepancy in
the parties1 incomes and creates a circumstance where respondent cannot meet his basic
monthly expenses.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing facts and authorities, respondent respectfully
requests this Court reverse the trial court's alimony award and enter an Order granting
such other and further relief as the Court deems appropnate. Respondent acknowledges
that appropriate relief in this instance may be a remand to the trial court with instructions
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to enter an appropriate alimony award based upon sufficient findings, which may require
the tnal court to receive new evidence.
DATED this

" 7 day of

, 2005
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

/ \

ttAti~~--

MICHAEL K. MOHRMAN
ZACHARY E. PETERSON
Attorneys for Appellants
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION

JOSEPHINE M. SCHOVAERS,

CASE NO. 014903735

Petitioner,
vs.
JOHN C* SCHOVAERS,
Respondent•

This matter came before the Court for a bench trial which
concluded on August 26, 2003.

At the conclusion of counsels'

closing arguments, the Court asked the respective counsel to submit
their proposed versions of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law.

The Court then took the matter under advisement.

The

petitioner filed her proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law on approximately September 16, 2003.
his

proposed

approximately

Findings

of

September

30,

Fact
2003.

and

The respondent submitted
Conclusions

The

Court

of

has

Law

on

carefully

considered these proposed Findings, together with the pleadings
that have been filed in this matter, the testimony that was adduced
at trial, the trial exhibits that were received into evidence and
counsels1 arguments.
herein stated.

Being now fully advised, the Court rules as
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LEGAL ANALYSIS
As the Court mentioned above, both sides submitted their
proposed versions of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
After carefully reviewing each of these, the Court concludes that
the petitioner's version more closely comports with the rulings
that the Court made during the trial and the rulings that the Court
will make herein.

The Court generally adopts the petitioner's

Findings and Conclusions, with the addition of the following
rulings and amendments:
1.

The petitioner is to amend Finding of Fact No. 20 and

delete Finding No. 21 to reflect that the respondent's pay was
reduced from approximately $6,000 per month to $4,300 per month
(gross) because of a reduction in work hours necessitated by his
having

to

assume

responsibilities.

all

of

the

parenting

and

household

In other words, both Findings imply that the

respondent was earning less than he was capable of. The testimony
does not bear this out and the Court makes no such findings.
2.

The petitioner discusses the parties' house and real

property at 1888 Spring Lane, Salt Lake City, Utah, in Finding Nos.
33 through 41. The petitioner is to re-draft these Findings first
to simplify them and second, to incorporate paragraph 5 (a) of the
respondent's proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The
Court concludes that the respondent's version in this respect is
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the more accurate version of the Court's ruling on the house and
the division of the proceeds upon the sale of the house.

The

Conclusions of Law should similarly be edited,
3.

At Finding Nos. 46 to 60, the petitioner discusses the

respondent!s stock in Schovaers Electronics.
favor of

the

respondent

on the

The Court rules in

issue of whether

this

stock

constitutes employment compensation or a gift from the respondent's
family.

Based on the totality of evidence before it, the Court

concludes that the stock was not intended to be a marital asset,
but rather a discrete gift to the respondent from his family.

In

reaching this decision, the Court particularly focused on the fact
that all of the stock was gifted strictly to the respondent and
there was no commingling of this stock with the remaining marital
assets.

Accordingly, the petitioner is to re-draft her proposed

Findings and Conclusions to reflect this ruling.
4.

At Finding Nos. 61 through 64, the petitioner discusses

the division of the parties1 vehicles.

The Court now rules that

there is to be an adjustment of value in the vehicles (i.e. between
the $11,175 value of the Jeep which the petitioner has been awarded
and the $1,500 Ford truck that the respondent has been awarded).
The

petitioner

is

to

aforementioned Findings.
be edited.

incorporate

this

ruling

into

the

The Conclusions of Law should similarly
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Beginning at Finding No. 71, the petitioner sets forth

the findings which provide the basis for an award of alimony. The
Court adopts these Findings in full, with the addition that this is
a classic case where alimony should be awarded. This is a marriage
that is long in duration and wherein the partiesf respective
incomes are greatly disparate. Credible evidence was presented to
the Court that the petitioner agreed to forego employment and
educational opportunities for the purpose of staying at home to
raise the parties1

children and to facilitate or enable the

respondent's ability to work, extensive hours at his family!s
business. The result was that the respondent was able to dedicate
himself to that business and earn a salary which provided a "highend11 lifestyle for the parties and their children.

In sharp

contrast to this lifestyle, the petitioner now lives in what can
only be described as a meager existence.

By her own account, the

petitioner's standard of living has significantly diminished.
Clearly, the petitioner has unmet financial needs and the
respondent has a demonstrated ability to assist her in terms of
paying her alimony.

In evaluating the respondents ability, the

Court particularly focused on the fact that the respondent greatly
inflated his claimed expenses.,

Therefore, after evaluating the

parties1 total financial picture and taking into account their
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respective income levels in light of their reasonable expenses and
the lifestyle enjoyed during the marriage, the Court determines
that alimony is properly set at $2,000 per month.
1.

The petitioner is to re-draft her proposed Findings and

Conclusions to reflect this ruling.
2.

The petitioner is to delete Finding No. 103 because the

Court does not find that the respondent has the financial ability
to pay $3,000 per month. Instead, the Court adopts the analysis of
Finding No. 106, which appropriately finds that alimony in the
amount of $2,000 would raise the petitioner's standard of living to
approximately what she enjoyed during the parties1 marriage.
3.

The Court is unclear on how the petitioner arrived at her

figures in Conclusion Nos. 25 and 26.

The Courtfs notes indicate

that together with the Court, the parties1 calculated that the
petitioner was entitled to $12,549.50 out of the parties1 Bank and
Investment Accounts.
reflect

The petitioner is to correct her figures to

the amounts discussed

at

the

conclusion of trial in

reaching the figure of $12,549.
Counsel for the petitioner is to submit an amended version of
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Divorce Decree
which comport with this Memorandum Decision.

While the Court

believes that this Memorandum Decision resolves all of the issues
taken

under

advisement

by

the

Court,

if

there

remain

any

13*
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84101
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Attorney for Respondent
370 E. South Temple, Suite 400
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOSEPHINE M. SCHOVAERS,
Petitioner,
vs.

:

COURT'S RULING

:

CASE NO. 014903735

:

JOHN C. SCHOVAERS,
Respondent.

:

This matter comes before the Court in connection with the
respondent's dual Notices to Submit seeking rulings on (1) the
respondent's Rule 52(b) Motion to Amend Findings and Rule 59(a)
Motion for New Trial and Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend
Judgment;

(2) the petitioner's

Proposed

Findings of Fact and

Proposed Decree of Divorce; and (3) the respondent's Objections to
Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
dated January 7, 2004.
pending

Motion

for

The Court notes that there is also a

Relief

from

Entry

of

Findings

of

Fact,

Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce Pursuant to Rule 60(b) (6)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

While this Motion has not

been fully briefed, the Court will discuss the merit of the same
herein.

Further, the Court notes that the parties have requested

oral argument on the foregoing matters.

At this juncture, the
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Court is not inclined to grant a hearing because the parties'
written submissions adequately detail their respective positions.
Therefore, the request for hearing is denied.
At the outset, the Court notes that after issuing its
Memorandum Decision on October 31, 2 003, the procedural posture of
this

matter

unfortunately

became

increasingly

convoluted,

crescendoing with the recently filed Motion for Relief.

In order

to address both the procedural and substantive matters raised by
the various pending Motions, Objections, and proposed Findings,
Conclusions and Decrees, the Court again carefully reviewed the
file in this matter (in its entirety), the relevant exhibits that
were accepted into evidence at trial, the Court's own notes on the
trial testimony and counsels' arguments and the transcript of the
closing arguments, which counsel graciously provided to the Court.
Having done so, the Court addresses each of the pending Motions and
Objections in turn.
The Court begins with the respondent's Motion to Amend and for
New Trial and to Alter or Amend Judgment.

First, the respondent

raises the concern that the Court issued its Memorandum Decision
without having considered his Proposed Findings and Conclusions.
To be clear, as the Court: specifically indicated in the initial
paragraph of its Memorandum Decision, both sides' proposed Findings
and Conclusions were carefully considered by the Court. Further,
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while there appears to be a discrepancy in the filing date of the
respondent's Proposed Findings and Conclusions (i.e. September 30,
2003, rather than September 16, 2003 , when they were actually
submitted) , the

Court

has

no

doubt

that

they

were

in

fact

considered.
In addition, the respondent places much emphasis

on the

Court's inadvertent reference to paragraph 5(a) of the respondent's
Proposed Findings and Conclusions.

As the respondent astutely

notes, the Court was intending to incorporate paragraph 5(a) of the
respondent's proposed Decree of Divorce, instead of the proposed
Findings and Conclusions.

However, this error should not in any

way be interpreted to suggest that the Court did not have the
respondent's proposed Findings and Conclusions and that she was
relying only on the respondent's proposed Decree of Divorce.
reiterate, both sides' proposed

To

Findings and Conclusions were

thoroughly considered.
Having made this clarification, the Court proceeds to address
the respondent's arguments that the Court erred in its analysis
relating to the issue of petitioner's alimony and in setting the
appropriate amount of child support.

With respect to alimony, the

respondent maintains that the Court should not have awarded the
petitioner any alimony despite the clear indication

(which the

Court articulated both during the trial and in its Memorandum
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Decision) that this was a "classic alimony" case.

The Court

concludes that the respondent's position is both legally and
factually flawed.
First, the respondent takes issue with the Court's finding
that the petitioner has a gross monthly income from all employment
of $1,380 per month. To clarify, the Court's alimony analysis was
not based on this figure.

Rather, the Court focused on the

historic income information for the petitioner, found in Exhibit
89, which indicated that her average gross monthly income for the
years 1998 through 2002 was $1,649.00.

Therefore, to the extent

that the petitioner's proposed'Findings can be construed as basing
the award of alimony on the figure of $1,3 80, those Findings should
be edited to reflect the Court's clarification herein.
Further, the respondent has erroneously interpreted this
Court's

suggestion

(not

ruling)

during

the

trial

that

the

petitioner's income would be set at least at the level of what she
would be earning in Salt Lake if she were still teaching here. The
respondent extrapolates from this suggestion that the Court must
have been adopting Exhibit 99, which would place the petitioner's
income at $2,683 per month. The respondent's child support figures
are also based on this monthly income.
While the Court did not expressly state this in its Memorandum
Decision, it was not persuaded that the petitioner's earning
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judged

represented in Exhibit 99.

by

the

COURT'S RULING
traditional

salary

schedule

Rather, as indicated above, the Court

was relying on the historic income information provided in Exhibit
8 9 because it found these figures to better reflect the reality
that

even when

she was working

as

a

full-time

teacher, the

petitioner never earned more than $22,969.00 per year.
Moreover, in awarding alimony, the Court particularly focused
on the respondent's expenses.

During the trial, the Court made

some tentative reductions in these expenses that would bring them
to

a

more

appropriate

and

reasonable

level.

Although

the

respondent relies in large part on these reductions, the Court
emphasizes that these were only tentative and were subject to the
Court's revision after it took the matter under advisement.

In

fact, after doing so, the Court was able to closely examine the
totality of the respondent's claimed expenditures in light of the
fact

that

Ana

would

soon

be

emancipated.

Based

on

this

examination, the Court concluded that the petitioner's Finding of
Fact 98, which further reduced the respondent's expenses to $2,189,
was accurate and should be adopted.
Finally, the respondent argues that he has no ability to pay
the alimony awarded by the Court on his gross monthly income of
$4,300.

Given that his reasonable expenditures are only $2,189,

the respondent does have the ability to pay the $2,000 alimony
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Further, the respondent's argument completely ignores the

fact that the Court awarded the respondent the entirety of the
Schovaers Electronics stock, which was potentially valued in the
hundreds of thousands of dollars. The Court is not persuaded that
simply because this stock has no defined dividend or income stream,
it should be ignored entirely in assessing ability to pay.

The

stock and the interest it represents is a valuable asset which
cannot

be

overlooked

when

considering

the

totality

of

the

respondent's overall financial condition and ability to pay.
Overall, the Court remains convinced that the alimony awarded
by it was neither improper nor excessive. Further, the amount of
child support proposed by the respondent is based on an incorrect
set of figures. The foregoing clarifications regarding the actual
figures relied on by the Court should make this point clear.
Therefore, the Court denies the respondent's Motion to Amend,
Motion for New Trial and Motion to Alter in the entirety. (Counsel
for the petitioner is to prepare an Order on the denial of these
Motions which is consistent with this Court's Ruling).
That brings the Court to the current status of this case.
After reviewing the file and the respondent's Motion for Relief
from Entry of Findings, there appears to be a consensus among the
parties and counsel that the Court's entry of the petitioner's
amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce
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The Court concurs that the entry of these

documents may have been premature, given the pendency of the
Motions

addressed

herein

and

the

respondent's

Objections.

Therefore, the Court grants the respondent's Motion for Relief and
vacates the Findings, Conclusions and Decree entered by the Court
on December 23, 2003.

Counsel for the respondent is to prepare an

Order vacating the same.
Instead, the Court would like counsel to reevaluate both the
final version of the petitioner's amended Findings, Conclusions and
Decree and the respondent's Objections thereto in light of the
clarifying statements and the decision made herein. Counsel should
confer and attempt to work out any final Objections posed by the
respondent in light of this Court's Ruling.

If any Objections

remain, the Court requests that counsel submit (1) a copy of the
final

amended

version

of

the

petitioner's

proposed

Findings,

Conclusions and Decree; (2) a copy of the remaining Objections to
the Court's law clerk; and (3) the petitioner's response thereto,
to the Court's law clerk, Alexandra C. Doctorman.
Dated this -3u _day of April, 2 004.

$

LESLIE A. LEWIS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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84101
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Attorney for Respondent
370 E. South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN & FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOSEPHINE M. SCHOVAERS,
Petitioner,
VS.
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FINDINGS OF FACTS
&
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
(Amended as per Court's 4/20/04 Ruling)

j

l

Case #014903735

I
)i

Judge Leslie Lewis
Commissioner Casey

JOHN C. SCHOVAERS
Respondent.

BACKGROUND
On August 25-26, 2003, the Court conducted a trial in the above-captioned matter.
Petitioner, Josephine M Schovaers ("Ms. Schovaers"), was present and represented by her
attorney Frank N. CalL Respondent John C. Schovaers ("Mr. Schovaers"), was present and
represented by his attorney Bert L. Dart. Both Mr. Schovaers and Ms. Schovaers were called and
testified as witnesses. Various exhibits were oflFered and admitted into evidence. On October 31,
2003, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision that set forth the Court's ruling in this matter.
On December 23, 2003, the Court signed and entered findings, conclusions and a decree of
divorce (collectively referred to as the "Initial Findings & Decree"). However, the Court later
-1-

vacated the Initial Findings & Decree in order to address objections and motions that had been
made prior to the Court's entry of those documents. Having now addressed and ruled upon those
objections and motions in the Court's Ruling of October April 20,2004, the Court intends these
writtenfindingsof facts and conclusions of law, and decree of divorce that is to be entered
pursuant to these findings and conclusions (collectively referred to as the "Final Findings &
Decree") to be and set forth Court'sfinaldecision and rulings in this matter. The Court notes
that, since trial and issuance of the Initial Findings & Decree, the parties have complied with the
Court's instruction concerning sale of the parties' home and that the parties have stipulated to
various additional matters that are noted and setforthherein*
As afinalnote of introduction, Anna, the parties' daughter, has become emancipated
since the time of trial and issuance of the Initial Findings & Decree. Thus, pursuant to an
agreement of the parties, the Final Findings & Decree have been modifiedfromthe Initial Findings
& Decree so as to omit orders relating to Anna's ongoing support and/or custody as those issues
are now moot. However, nothing in the Final Findings & Decree is intended to alter the Court's
prior rulings and orders relating to the parties' respective obligations and rights with regard to
Anna while she was a minor.
Based on the evidence, testimony and arguments presented to the Court during the trial,
the Court makes and issues the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

At the time of trial, Ms. Schovaers was 50 years of age and was residing in Lake

Stevens, Washington.
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2.

At the time of trial, Mr. Schovaers was 49 years of age and was residing in Salt

Lake County, Utah.
3.

At the time of thefilingof the Petition for Divorce in this case, both parties were

residing in Salt Lake County, Utah, and had been doing so for more than one year.
4.

Ms. Schovaers and Mr. Schovaers were married to each other in Utah on May 15,

5.

At the time of trial, the parties had been married for more than 24 years.

6.

After their marriage, the parties lived and resided together in Utah until the time of

1979.

their separation.
7.

The parties separated and began living apartfromeach other in about April or May

of2001.
8.

Irreconcilable differences have arisen which prevent the partiesfrommaintaining a

viable marriage.
9.

The parties have agreed that they should be granted a decree of divorce on the

ground of irreconcilable differences.
10.

The parties have had two children born as issue of their marriage: Aundrea

Schovaers (D.O.B. 11/13/80) ("Aundrea"); and Anna Schovaers (D.O.B. 1/29/86) ("Anna").
11.

Aundrea was an adult at the time of thefilingof the Petition for Divorce.

12.

At the time of thefilingof the Petition for Divorce, and at the time of trial, Anna

was a minor.
13.

Anna has resided in Utah at all relevant times and was, at the time of trial, residing
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with Mr. Schovaers.
14.

Utah is Anna's home state pursuant to U.C.A. §78-45c-201.

15.

There are no other cases relating to Anna pending before any court of this state, or

any court of any other state.
16.

The parties agreed that they should have joint legal custody of Anna while she was

a minor.
17.

The parties agreed that Mr. Schovaers would be awarded physical custody of

Anna while she was a minor, with Ms. Schovaers to have visitation with Anna pursuant to any
schedule agreed to between Ms. Schovaers and Anna. Furthermore, the parties agreed that Ms.
Schovaers would be responsible for the costs of exercising visitation with Anna.
18.

The parties agreed that Mr. Schovaers would encourage and facilitate Anna's

visitation with Ms. Schovaers and would encourage and facilitate written and telephonic
communication between Anna and Ms. Schovaers.
19.

At the time of trial, Mr. Schovaers was employed fiill-time with Schovaers

Electronics and had a gross monthly income of $4,300.00 per month.
20.

Prior to the parties' separation, Mr. Schovaers was earing approximately

$6,000.00 per month. However, after the parties" separation, Mr. Schovaers pay was reduced to
$4,300.00 per month because of the reduction in work hours necessitated by his having to assume
all of the parenting and household responsibilities.
21.

Historically, during the last Ml five years prior to trial (1998 through 2002), Mr.

Schovaers had the following gross income as a result of his employment with Schovaers
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Electronics1:
Year
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
22.

Gross Monthly Income
$ 5,845.00
$ 5,950.00
$ 6,054.00
$ 4,767.00
$ 4,300.00

firggg Annual Tnrnme

$ 70,150.00
$ 71,400.00
$ 72,651.00
$ 57,200.00
$ 51,600.00

Based on theforegoinghistoric income information for Mr. Schovaers, Mr.

Schovaers has had an average gross annual incomefromemployment of $64,600.00 per year for
the past five years, which equates to an average gross monthly income of $5,383.00 per month.
23.

At the time of trial Ms. Schovaers was employed part-time as a Sales Clerk for

The Bon^ and as an "on-calT substitute teacherforvarious school districts in Washington.
24.

At the time of trial Ms. Schovaers had a gross monthly incomefromall

employment of $1,380.00 per month.
25.

Mr. Schovaers asserts that Ms. Schovaers is currently voluntarily under-employed

and capable offindingfull-time employment.
26.

Immediately prior to the parties' separation. Ms. Schovaers was working part-time

as a teacher for Jordan School District.
27.

Historically, during the last full five years prior to trial (1998 through 2002), Ms.

l

The listedfigureswere takenfromtheright-handcolumn on page 3 of Exhibit #93 which
is Mr. Schovaers' Social Security Statement. The listedfiguresare also consistent with the
testimony and income information for Mr. Schovaers as set forth in the various income tax
statement that were admitted as exhibits. Kg. Exhibits #35, #36, #37, #38, & #94.
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Schovaers had the following gross incomefromher employment2:
Year
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
28*

Gross Annual Income
$ 19,358.00
$20,038.00
$ 13,997.00
$ 22,969.00
$ 19,796.00

Gross Monthly Income
$ 1,613.00
$ 1,669.00
$ 1,166.00
$ 1,914.00
$ 1,649.00

Based on theforegoinghistoric income information for Ms. Schovaers, Ms.

Schovaers has had an average gross annual incomefromemployment of $19,231.00 per year,
which equates to an average gross monthly income of $1,602.00 per month.
29.

Ms. Schovaers has never earned a gross annual income greater than $22,969.00

per year ($1,914.00 per month), even when she was working full-time as a teacher.
30.

Based on Ms. Schovaers' historical average gross monthly income between 1998

and 2002, it would be reasonable to impute a gross monthly income of $1,649.00 per month to
Ms. Schovaers for purposes of determining alimony, even though Ms. Schovaers' actual gross
monthly income at the time of trial was $1,380.00 per month.
31.

Prior to and during the course of their marriage, the parties acquired various items

of personal property that have been listed in Exhibit #21.
32.

The parties agree, as to the property listed in Exhibit #21, the Court should award

Ms. Schovaers the property listed in: "Exhibit A" of Exhibit #21; Exhibit B" of Exhibit #21; and

2

The listedfigureswere takenfromthe right-hand column on page 3 of Exhibit #89 which
is Ms. Schovaers' Social Security Statement. The listedfiguresare also consistent with the
testimony and income information for Ms. Schovaers as set forth in the various income tax
statement that were admitted as exhibits. E.g. Exhibits #35, #36, #37, #81, & #82.
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those items of property identified as "Requested by Petitioner" in Exhibit C of Exhibit #21.
33.

The parties have agreed that Mr. Schovaers shall make copies of all of post-

separation photographs of the parties' children in his possession and deliver copies of those
photographs to Ms. Schovaers.
34.

During the course of the parties' marriage, the parties purchased and acquired a

home and real property located at 1888 Spring Lane, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 (the "home").
35.

During the course of the parties9 marriage, the home was titled and held in the

parties' joint names and was intended and held by the parties as joint marital property.
36.

Later, during the pendency of this case, the Court permitted Mr. Schovaers to

refinance the home in order to lower the monthly mortgage payments.
37.

As part of that refinancing, Mr. Schovaers was permitted to have Ms. Schovaers'

name removedfromthe title to the home without effecting her ownership interest in the home.
38.

At the time of trial the home was subject to a mortgage that was held by

Countywide Home Loans, Inc (the "Countrywide mortgage").
39.

Since the parties' separation, Mr. Schovaers has made mortgage payments on the

parties' home in the amount of $32,848.00. Ms. Schovaers" one-half share of those mortgage
payments would be $16,424.00.
40.

The parties agreed that the home was martial property and that the home should be

sold and the net proceeds divided between the parties.
41.

After trial the parties sold the home and used the proceeds to pay the

Countrywide mortgage and pay the sales commission and cbsing costs associated with the sale.
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42.

The parties divided the net proceedsfromthe sale of the home equally between

themselves, but made adjustments by: (1) taking $12,549.50fromMr. Schovaers' share and
giving it to Ms. Schovaers as payment for her share of the parties' bank/investment accounts; (2)
taking $16,424.00fromMs. Schovaers' share and giving it to Mr. Schovaers as payment for her
one-half share of the mortgage payments that Mr. Schovaers made between the time of separation
and trial; (3) taking $1,798.50fromMs. Schovaers1 share and giving it to Mr. Schovaers as
payment for her one-half share of the 2003 property taxes that were paid by Mr. Schovaers; (4)
taking $2,165.00fromMs. Schovaers' share and giving it to Mr. Schovaers as payment for her
one-half share of the mortgage payments that Mr. Schovaers madefromthe time of trial to the
date the home was sold; and (5) taking $2,585.00fromMs. Schovaers' share and giving it to Mr.
Schovaers in order to equitably divide the value of the vehicles that were awarded to the parties.
A calculation of the parties' division and distribution of the proceedsfromthe sale of the home is
attached hereto as "Exhibit A."
43.

The parties' agreed division and allocation of the proceedsfromthe sale of the

home as set forth above and in Exhibit A was reasonable, equitable and consistent with the
Court's anticipated ruling in this matter.
44.

To the extent, if any, that Mr. Schovaers has not already paid the various expenses

relating to the parties' home, and except as otherwise dealt with by the parties in their division of
the proceedsfromthe sale of the home, it would be reasonable and equitable to order Mr.
Schovaers to be solely responsible for paying any expenses relating to the home, including but not
limited to any and all utilities, repairs, insurance premiums and/or other expenses.
-8-
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45.

At the time of the parties' separation, the parties had at least $34,000.00 ofjoint

martial funds in various bank/investment accounts with such funds being held at: Paine Webber;
U.S. Bank; Charles Schwab: Community 1st National; and Treasury Credit Union.3
46.

Since the parties' separation, Mr. Schovaers has paid $6,522.00 worth of property

taxes on the parties' home.
47.

At the time of trial, Ms. Schovaers had control over accounts having $2,379.00 of

the parties' joint marital funds (Funds held in the Treasury Credit Union account and the proceeds
from the Community 1st National account)
48.

If the Court were to equally divided the funds in the parties' joint marital

bank/investment accounts at the time of separation, but fectoring in tax payments and those joint
funds currently in Ms. Schovaers' possession, Ms. Schovaers would be entitled to $12,549.50,
with that amount being calculated as follows:
Total Joint Account holdings at separation
Property taxes paid by Mr. Schovaers between separation & trial
Funds in Ms. Schovaers possession at trial
Total Funds Subject to Division

$34,000.00
($ 6,522.00)
($ 2.379.00)
$25,099.00

$25,099,00 + 2 = $12,549,50
49.

It would be feir and equitable to award Ms. Schovaers $12,549.50 worth of the

3

At the time of the parties' separation, the parties" joint bank/investment accounts actually
had approximately $40,760.00 offluidsin them but the Court is using $34,000.00 as the total
balance of those accounts in order to account for funds that were deposited into the accounts but
actually belong to the parties' children and to account for funds that Ms. Schovaers took from
one of the accounts when the parties separated.
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parties' bank/investment accounts.
50.

During the course of the parties' marriage, Mr. Schovaers acquired ownership of

116 shares of stock in Schovaers Electronics, with the value at the time of each acquisition of the
stock as indicated below:
Acquisition Date
3/15/85
9/30/98
12/16/91
4/30/92
10/15/93

# Shares
35 shares
34 shares
13 shares
13 shares
12 shares

Total Value
$16,873.90
$19,886.32
$19,383.00
$19,539.00
$19,965.00

Value per share
$ 482.11/share
$ 584.89/share
$l,491.00/share
$l,503.00/share
$l,663.75/share

12/22/95

9 shares

$19,116.09

$2,214.01/share

See, Exhibits #47 & #48.
51.

At the time of each acquisition, the stock was valued by Mr. Schovaers' parents,

who were the owners and grantors of the stock.
52.

As of December 22,1995, the last time when Mr. Schovaers acquired shares of the

Schovaers Electronic^ stock, the shares had, as determined by the owners and grantors of the
stock, a value of $2,214.01 per share, making the value of the 116 shares held by Mr. Schovaers
worth at least $256,825.16. See, page 6 of Exhibit #48.
53.

Over the ten year time span when the stocks were acquired by Mr. Schovaers, the

shares of stock only increased in value and never declined in value during any given year.
54.

On an annualized basis,fromdate of first acquisition (3/15/85), to date of the last

acquisition (12/22/95), the stock has increased in value, as determined by the owners and grantors
of the stock, at least 35.9% per year. ($482.11/share in 1985 to $2,214.01/share in 1995).
55.

If a historic rate of appreciation of 35% per year were used to value the stock, the
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shares would currently be worth about $24,425.00 per share, or $2,833,300.00 for all 116 shares.
56.

The Courtfindsthat the stock was given solely to Mr. Schovaers as discrete gifts

from his parents, and not by way of any employment compensation.
57.

Furthermore, the Courtfindsthat Mr. Schovaers intended to keep the stock as

separate property and that the stock was never co-mingled with marital property.
58.

During the course of the parties' marriage, the parties acquired ownership of a

Ford Truck and a 1999 Jeep Grand Cherokee, neither of which are subject to any liens or loans.
59.

At the time of trial, the Ford truck had afairmarket value of $1,500.00 and the

1999 Jeep Grand Cherokee had afeirmarket value of $11,175.00.
60.

About 30 days prior to trial, Mr. Schovaers purchased a new 2003 Jeep Grand

Cherokee that is subject to a loan in an amount that is almost equal to the full price of the Jeep.
61.

The parties agree that the Ford Truck should be awarded to Mr. Schovaers as his

sole property and that the 1999 Jeep be awarded to Ms. Schovaers as her sole property.
62.

The parties agree that the 2003 Jeep should be awarded to Mr. Schovaers as his

sole property and that he shall be solely responsible for any loansrelatingto that vehicle. (The
parties' equity in the 2003 Jeep is virtually zero since the Jeep is subject to a does not have any
markSince the 2003 Jeep was
63.

The parties have agreed that Ms. Schovaers should pay $2,585.00fromthe

proceedsfromthe sale of the home to compensate Mr. Schovaers for the diflfering values of the
vehicles that are being awarded to the parties.
64.

During the course of the parties' marriage, Mr. Schovaers obtained a limited
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partnership interest in afamilypartnership that was established by his parents.
65.

In January of 2003, Mr. Schovaers received a distributionfromthat family

partnership in the form of a promissory note. See Exhibit #62.
66.

Mr. Schovaers has never commingled the promissory note with marital assets and

has never intended the promissory note to be converted to joint or marital property.
67.

Other than the mortgage and the loan on the 2003 Jeep, the parties have no debts.

68*

Each party has been able to payfortheir own attorney's fees in this case and are

not in need of assistancefromthe other party in paying those fees.
69.

Ms. Schovaers' maiden name was "McEntire."

70.

During the parties' marriage, Ms. Schovaers worked for Schovaers Electronics for

about nine to twelve months but was not paid for that wort (Mr. Schovaers contests this feet.)
71.

After about one year of marriage, the parties agreed that Ms. Schovaers would

forego employment or post-high school education in order to be responsible for the day-to-day
care of the parties' children and home.
72.

Thereafter, Ms. Schovaers did forego any employment and/or post-high school

education for several years in order to be responsible for the day-to-day care of the parties'
children and home.
73.

During the course of the parties' marriage, Mr. Schovaers regularly worked

between 60 to 70 hours per week at Schovaers Electronics.
74.

But for Ms. Schovaers' actions in foregoing employment and post-high school

education and assuming responsibilityforthe day-to-day care of the parties' children and home,
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Mr. Schovaers would not have been able to dedicate as much time and effort as he did to his
employment and advancement at Schovaers Electronics.
75.

Ms. Schovaers9 actions in foregoing employment, foregoing post-high school

education, and assuming responsibility for the day-to-day care of the parties' children and home
significantly increased Mr. Schovaers" earning capability and advancement at Schovaers
Electronics.
76.

In 1991. while she continued to be responsible for the day-to-day care of the

parties' children and home, Ms. Schovaers began going to college on a part-time basis and
eventually graduated in late 1997.
77.

Initially, Mr. Schovaers was opposed to Ms. Schovaers going to college and

required her to pay for her college education by using non-marital funds that she had inherited.
78.

Later, Mr. Schovaers contributed to some of Ms. Schovaers' tuition expenses.

79.

Ms. Schovaers eventually obtained a teaching certificate and was endorsed to

teach art, with a secondary endorsement in history.
80.

In 1998, Ms. Schovaers began working as a full-time teacher for Granite School

District.
81.

Later, Ms. Schovaers left employment with Granite School District and began

working for Jordan School District on afoll-timebasis.
82.

After working for Jordan School District for a period of time, Ms. Schovaers' full-

time teaching load in Art was reduced because of budget cuts. However, Ms. Schovaers was
offered additional classes in other subjects but would have been required to return to college ami
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Phi.

obtain additional training and endorsements in order to teach those additional classes on a
permanent basis.
83.

Rather than incur the additional time and expense of returning to college to obtain

additional education and endorsements, Ms. Schovaers continued teaching part-time for Jordan
School district and eventually obtained part-time employment with ZCMI and later with the May
Stores in order to supplement her income.
84*

Due to her extended absencefromthe work-force, her age, and her delayed

acquisition of a post-high school education in order to care for the parties' children and home,
Ms. Schovaers" lifetime earning potential has been significantly and permanently impaired.
85.

During the course of the parties' marriage, and at the time of their separation, the

parties enjoyed a high standard of living.
86.

The parties' income tax returns for the three tax years immediately prior to their

separation indicate that the parties has a joint annual income of about $90,000 per year. See
Exhibits #35, #36, & #37.
87.

Ms. Schovaers testified that prior to and at the time of their separation, she was

able to purchase whatever she wanted and had never been unable to purchase any items or
services that she and/or Mr. Schovaers desired.
88.

For example, testimony at trial indicated that, prior to and at the time of their

separation, the parties:
(a)

Had purchased and were living in a 4,200 square foot luxury home in the

prestigious Cottonwood/Walker Lane residential neighborhood of Salt Lake County;
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(b)

Had purchased and maintained elaborate andfittingfurnishings for their

(c)

Regularly andfrequentlyskied;

(d)

Traveled when they desired, vacationing in Idaho, the Northwest, and other

(e)

Regularly boated at Lake Powell;

f f)

Took their children to Europe for vacation;

(g)

Engaged in whatever entertainment activities they desired;

(h)

Saved significant sums of money which they invested in various stocks and

(i)

Purchased whatever clothing they desired; and

(j)

Were generally able to live and maintain an upper class lifestyle,

home;

places;

bonds;

89.

Ms. Schovaers testified that due to the parties' separation and the significant

reduction in fiinds available to her, she has been forced to eliminate all of her discretionary
expenses and has had to skimp on, and in some cases, even forego some of her most basic
necessary living needs and expenses.
90.

The amounts that Ms. Schovaers current claims to be spending for basic necessary

living expenses are set forth in Exhibit #98.
91.

For example, Ms. Schovaers testified that since the parties' separation, she has,

among other things:
(a)

Been forced to live in a 600 square foot apartment in an industrial/low
-15-
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income neighborhood;
(b)

Has less than $L300.00 of earned income each month to meet her basic

necessary living expenses;
(c)

Has not been skiing because she cannot afford it;

(d)

Has not been on any vacations since she cannot afford it;

(e)

Except for hiking which isfree,and basic cable television service, she has

not spent any money on entertainment because she cannot afford it;
(f)

Cannot afford to make gifts or donations; and

(g)

Cannot afford to purchase insurance to replace the health insurance that

she will lose once the parties are divorced.
92.

Ms. Schovaers also testified that she had depleted almost all of her savings in order

to meet her basic necessary living expenses and has been required to purchase generic brand foods
and shop at second stores in order to help meet her expenses. Mr. Schovaers9 counsel even
acknowledged during closing arguments that Ms. Schovaers' expenses were "spartan.'"
93.

Ms. Schovaers is clearly in need of significantfinancialassistancefromMr.

Schovaers in order to meet even her most basic necessary living expenses.
94.

Unlike Ms. Schovaers, since the parties1 separation, Mr. Schovaers has been able

to maintain the same lifestyle that the parties had prior to and at the time of the parties'
separation. For example, Mr. Schovaers has been able to:
(a)

Continue to living in the parties' luxury 4,200 square foot home;

(b)

Spend in excess of $4,137.00 per month on various expenses;
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(c)

Engage in and spend significant sums on entertainment;

(d)

Engage in and spend significant sums on vacations;

(e)

Spend significant sums on gifts tofriendsand family;

(f)

Spend significant sums on donations to charities and other organizations;

(g)

Purchase of a new 2003 Jeep. See, Exhibit #26.

and

95.

In feet Mr. Schovaers* counsel acknowledged in closing arguments that some of

Mr. Schovaers* claimed expenses were excessive and more than what was needed for such
expenses.
96.

The Courtfindsthat many of Mr. Schovaers' claimed basic living expenses, as

alleged in Exhibit #26, are excessive and inappropriate for purposes of determining his ability to
pay alimony. For example:
(a)

Mr. Schovaers7 claimed expense of $287.00 per month for property taxes

is inappropriate to consider for purposes of determining Mr. Schovaers' ability to pay alimony
because the Court is giving Mr. Schovaers' full credit for those taxes when calculating how to
split the parties' bank/investment accounts. To let Mr. Schovaers claim those property tax
payments again as part of his alleged monthly living expenses would allow him to claim those
expenses twice.
(b)

Mr. Schovaers' claimed expense of $65.00 per month for real property

insurance and $125.00 per month for home maintenance will be eliminated by hte sale of the
parties' home, thereby making those expenses unnecessary and inapplicable when determining Mr.
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Schovaers' ability to pay alimony.
(c)

Mr. Schovaers' claimed monthly food expense of $700.00 is unreasonable

and far exceeds Mr. Schovaers' needs. First, it would be inappropriate to include the food costs
for Aundrea in determining Mr. Schovaers9 ability to pay alimony since Aundrea is an adult.
Furthermore, it would bestow an inappropriate and significant windfall upon Mr. Schovaers to
permit him to claim food expenses relating to Annaforpurposes of determining his ability to pay
alimony in light of Ms. Schovaers9 obligation to pay child support for Anna during her minority
and since Anna is/was only about six months awayfromemancipation at the time of trial Thus, a
more appropriate amount for Mr. Schovaers food expense would be $250.00 per month.
(d)

Mr. Schovaers" claimed utility expenses of $432.00 per month (electric,

gas, sewer, water, phone, etc) are unreasonably high for purposes of determining his ability to pay
alimony since those expense are based on utilities for the parties' large 4,200 square foot home
that is/was sold. Furthermore, since Anna is/was only about six months awayfromemancipation
at the time of trial, it would bestow an inappropriate and significant windfall upon Mr. Schovaers
to permit him to claim expenses relating to Anna for purposes of determining his ability to pay
alimony. A more reasonable amount for Mr. Schovaers' utility expense in light of the anticipated
emancipation of Anna and the sale of the home would be $250.00 per month.
(e)

Mr. Schovaers' claimed clothing expense of 325.00 per month for both he

and Anna is unreasonable. It would bestow an inappropriate and significant windfall upon Mr.
Schovaers to permit him to clothing expenses relating to Anna for purposes of determining his
ability to pay alimony in light of Ms. Schovaers' obligation to pay child support for Anna during
-18-

her minority and since Anna is/was only about six months awayfromemancipation at the time of
trial. Thus, a more reasonable amount for Mr. Schovaers1 clothing expense would be $150.00 per
month.
(f)

Mr. Schovaers' claimed expenses for Anna's schooling is inappropriate to

consider for purposes of determining alimony. It would bestow an inappropriate and significant
windfell upon Mr. Schovaers to permit him to claim Anna's school expenses for purposes of
determining his ability to pay alimony in light of Ms. Schovaers9 obligation to pay child support
for Anna during her minority and since Anna is/was only about six months away from
emancipation at the time of trial
(g)

Mr. Schovaers' claimed expenses of $ 150.00 per month for gifts and

donations are purely discretionary expenses that are not necessary basic living expenses.
(h)

Mr. Schovaers' claimed expenses of $371.00 per month for auto expenses

is unreasonable under the circumstances. A more reasonable amount for this expense would be
$200.00 per month.
(i)

Mr. Schovaers' claimed new expense of $511.00 per month for his

purchase of the new 2003 Jeep is unreasonable under the circumstances, particularly when Mr.
Schovaers claims to have a reduced income and previously claimed to be unable to service the
previous home mortgage of about $1,600.00 per month, which the Court then permitted him to
refinance to about $620.00 per month. Although Mr. Schovaers may actually be paying $511.00
per month for the new 2003 Jeep, it was unreasonable for Mr. Schovaers to incur such an
obligation just one month before the trial in this matter. A more reasonable amount for this
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expense for purposes of determining his ability to pay alimony would be $350.00 per month.
97.

For purposes of determining Mr. Schovaers1 ability to pay alimony, the Court finds

that Mr. Schovaers' reasonable basic living expenses are as follows:

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

(9
(g)
(h)

0)
(j)
(k)

98.

Mortgage
Food
Utilities
Laundry & Dry Cleaning
Clothing
Medical/Dental
Insurance
Entertainment
Vacation/Travel
Auto Expense/Maintenance
Car Payment

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

Total Monthly Expenses

$2 A 89.00

619.00
250.00
250.00
50.00
150.00
20.00
25.00
150.00
125.00
200.00
350.00

In light of Mr. Schovaers'* average gross monthly income of $5,383.00 per month

over the past five years, Mr. Schovaers has the ability to pay at least $2,000.00 per month, if not
more, toward alimony after paying for his basic necessary living expenses.
99.

Even if Mr. Schovaers' reduced gross monthly income of $4,300 per month were

used, Mr. Schovaers would have the ability to pay at least $2,000.00 per month, if not more,
toward alimony after paying for his basic necessary living expenses.
100.

Furthermore, Mr. Schoavers' ability to pay alimony of at least $2,000,00 per

month is bolstered by the fact that the Court is awarding Mr. Schovaers all of the Schovaers
Electronics stock which is worth hundreds of thousands of dollars. Thus, Mr. Schovaers clearly
has thefinancialability and resources to pay alimony of at least $2,000,00 per month
101.

Ms. Schovaers is not able to maintain the standard of living she enjoyed prior to
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and/or at the time of the parties' separation without significantfinancialassistance from Mr.
Schovaers.
102.

Ms. Schovaers is in need offinancialassistance in order to meet even her basic

necessary living expenses.
103.

Mr. Schovaers has thefinancialability to pay at least $2,000.00 per month of

alimony to Ms. Schovaers.
104.

Although Ms. Schovaers has obtained a teaching certificate and is capable of

obtaining full-time employment, her earing capacity has been significantly and permanently
impaired because of her age, the delay in entering the workforce, and her limited teaching
experience.
105.

Ms. Schovaers has never earned more than $22,969.00 per year, even when she

was working full-time.
106.

Although the Court is imputing a monthly gross income of $1,649.00 per month to

Ms. Schovaers for purposes of determining alimony, even if Ms. Schovaers' highest actual annual
earnings of $22,969.00 per year ($1,914.00 per month) were imputed to her, alimony payments of
$24,000.00 per year ($2,000.00 per month) would give Ms. Schovaers an annual income of about
$46,900.00, which is roughly the standard of living she enjoyed prior to and at the time of the
parties' separation (At the time of separation, the parties' joint income exceeded $90,000.00;
$90,000 - 2 people = $45,000 per person).
107.

In order to equalize the parties' respective standards of living, and in order to

restore Ms. Schovaers to a semblance of the standard of living that she had prior to and at the
-21-
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time of the parties' separation, Ms. Schovaers would needfinancialassistancefromMr.
Schovaers in the amount of at least $24,000.00 per year ($2,000.00 per month).
108.

The Courtfindsthat the parties' situation is a classic case where alimony should be

awarded. This is a marriage that is long in duration and wherein the parties' respective incomes
are greatly disparate. Credible evidence was presented to the Court that Ms. Schovaers agreed to
forego employment and educational opportunities for the purpose of staying at home to raise the
parties' children and to facilitate and enable Mr. Schovaers to work extensive hours at his family's
business. The result was that Mr. Schovaers was able to dedicate himself to that business and
earn a salary which provided a "high-end" lifestyle for the parties and their children. In sharp
contrast to this lifestyle, Ms. Schovaers now lives in what can only be described as a meager
existence. By her own account, Ms. Schovaers9 standard of living has significantly diminished.
109.

Clearly, Ms. Schovaers has unmetfinancialneeds and Mr. Schovaers has a

demonstrated ability to assist Ms. Schovaers in terms of paying alimony. In evaluating Mr.
Schovaers' ability, the Court particularly focused on the feet that Mr. Schovaers greatly inflated
his claimed expenses. Therefore, after evaluating the parties' totalfinancialpicture and taking
into account their respective assets and property, their respective income levels in light of their
reasonable expenses, and the lifestyle enjoyed during, their marriage, the Court determines that it
would be equitable, reasonable and proper to set alimony at $2,000.00 per month.
110.

Setting alimony at $2,000.00 per month would raise Ms. Schovaers' standard of

living to approximately what she enjoyed during the parties' marriage.
111.

During the parties1 marriage:
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(a)

Mr. Schovaers obtained and acquired an interest in retirement benefits

and/or profit sharing plans provided and/or maintained by Schovaers Electronics;
(b)

Mr. Schovaers obtained and acquired an interest in an Individual

Retirement Account(s) with Paine Webber;
(c)

Ms. Schovaers obtained and acquired an interest in retirement benefits

and/or 401(k) plan maintained by Utah Retirement Systems; and
(d)

Ms. Schovaers obtained and acquired an interest in an Individual

Retirement Account(s) with Paine Webber.
112.

The parties agree that all of their respective retirement plan benefits were acquired

during the course of their marriage and that those retirement plan benefits are joint marital assets
that should be equally divided between the parties and subject to a qualified domestic relations
order. The parties also agree that, if possible,, Ms. Schovaers' one-half share of the Schovaers
Electronics profit sharing plan assets should be divided and distributed in kind so as to avoki any
valuation disputes.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court has jurisdiction in this matter and venue is proper.

2.

The parties should be granted a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable

differences.
3.

Since Anna is now emancipated, the Court need not make any further orders

concerning Anna's custody, visitation and support. However, to the extent that the parties have

not already paid and satisfied theirfinancialobligations to each other with respect to Anna white
she was a minor, the parties should be entitled and ordered to do so.4
4.

As to the issue of alimony:
(a)

Ms. Schovaers1 currentfinancialcondition is extremely poor and she

currently has a standard of living that is drastically lower than the high standard of living that she
had prior to and at the time of the parties' separation
(b)

Ms. Schovaers is in desperate need of significantfinancialsupport as she is

currently living at a very low income level and is having difficulty meeting even her most basic
necessary living expenses.
(c)

Because of her age, the delay in entering the workforce, and her limited

employment experience, Ms. Schovaers" earing capacity has been significantly impaired
(d)

Although Mr. Schovaers was awarded custody of Anna, Anna was 1TA

years old at the time of trial and approximately 6 months awayfromemancipation. Furthermore,
Ms. Schovaers was required to pay child support for Anna to Mr. Schovaers to help defray
Anna's living expenses. Thus, Mr. Schovaers' custody and expenses relating to Anna did not

4

For purposes of determining the proper level of child support, the Court used Mr.
Schovaers' current gross monthly income of $4,300.00 and impute income to Ms. Schovaers at a
level of $1,914.00 per month ($22,969.00 per year), which is the most Ms. Schovaers has ever
earned per year, even when working full-time. Based on those income levels, Ms. Schovaers was
to pay Mr. Schovaers $187.88 per month for Anna's support until the later of either: Anna's 18th
birthday, or graduationfromhigh school, whichever is later, with the payment of such amount to
be made by giving Mr. Schovaers a credit of $187.88 per month against his monthly
alimony/support payments to Ms. Schovaers. To the extent those payments/credits have not
already been made and/or applied, the parties should be entitled to those payments/credits.
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materially impact or reduce his ability to pay alimony.
(e)

Ms. Schovaers did, for about 9 to 12 months, work for Schovaers

Electronics during the parties9 marriage for which Ms. Schovaers claims she was not paid
(f)

But for Ms. Schovaers' actions inforegoingemployment and education in

order to care for the parties' children and home, Mr. Schovaers would not have been able to
dedicate as much time and efifort as he did to his employment and his advancement at Schovaers
Electronics. Ms. Schovaers' actions of foregoing employment and education, and assuming
responsibility for the day-to-day care of the parties' home and children significantly and materially
increased Mr. Schovaers' earnings, earning capability and employment advancement, while
simultaneously significantly impairing Ms. Schovaers own earning abilities.
(g)

Currently, Mr. Schovaers is gainfully employed and enjoys an extremely

high standard of living that meets and/or exceeds the standard of living that he enjoyed prior to
and/or at the time of the parties' separation.
(h)

Over the last five years prior to trial, Mr. Schovaers had an average gross

monthly income of $5,383.00 per month.
(i)

Many of Mr. Schovaers' claimed basic necessary living expenses are

excessive, inflated and inappropriate to consider for purposes of determining Mr. Schovaers'
ability to pay alimony because they include:
(1)

Expenses for which Mr. Schovaers is/was reimbursed by Ms.

Schovaers' child support payments;
(2)

Expenses for the Aundrea, the parties' adult daughter;
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(3)

Discretionary in nature and/orfornon-essential purposes such as

(4)

Expenses for which Mr. Schovaers will/has received full credit for

gifts, donations, etc.

in the distribution of the sale proceedsfromthe parties' home and/or division of the parties'
bank/investment accounts (e.g. the mortgage and property tax expenditures); and
(5)

Obligations and expenses for Anna which were going to be and

have now been eliminated due to Anna's emancipation six months after triaL
(j)

Ms. Schovaers' reasonable basic necessary living expenses amount to

approximately $2,189.00 per month.
(k)

Given his current monthly income of $4,300.00, hisfiveyear historical

average monthly income of $5,383.00, and the valuable Schovaers Electronics stock and other
property being awarded to him, Mr. Schovaers has significant ability to pay at least $2,000.00 per
month toward alimony after paying for his basic necessary living expenses.
(1)

It would be reasonable to impute a monthly gross income of $1,649.00 to

Ms. Schovaers for purposes offixingalimony. However, even if Ms. Schovaers' highest actual
annual earnings of $22,969.00 per year were imputed to her, alimony payments of $24,000.00 per
year ($2,000.00 per month) would give Ms. Schovaers an annual income of about $46,900.00,
which is roughly the standard of living she enjoyed prior to and at the time of the parties'
separation.5 The Court reiterates that it is not basing Ms. Schovaers' need for alimony on her

5

At the time of separation, the parties' joint income exceeded $90,000.00; $90,000 + 2
people = $45,000 per person.
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actual gross monthly income of $1,380.00, but rather on an imputed gross monthly income of
$1,914.08 per month, which is the most Ms. Schovaers ever earned while working full-time.6
5.

Thus, thefactorsset forth in U.C.A. §30-3-5(8)(a) weigh heavily infavorof an

order requiring Mr. Schovaers to pay alimony to Ms. Schovaers. The Courtfindsand concludes
that the parties' situation is a classic case where alimony should be awarded This is a marriage
that was long in duration and where the parties' respective incomes are greatly disparate.
Credible evidence was presented to the Court that Ms. Schovaers agreed to forego employment
and educational opportunities for the purpose of staying at home to raise the parties* children and
tofacilitateand enable Mr. Schovaers to work extensive hours at hisfamily'sbusiness. The result
was that Mr. Schovaers was able to dedicate himself to that business and earn a salary which
provided a "high-end" lifestyle for the parties and their children. In sharp contrast to this lifestyle,
Ms. Schovaers now lives in what can only be described as a meager existence. By her own
account, Ms. Schovaers9 standard of living has significantly diminished. Clearly, Ms. Schovaers
has unmetfinancialneeds and Mr. Schovaers has a demonstrated ability to assist Ms. Schovaers in
terms of paying alimony. In evaluating Mr. Schovaers9 ability, the Court particularly focused on
thefactthat Mr. Schovaers greatly inflated his claimed expenses. Therefore, after evaluating the
parties' totalfinancialpicture, taking into account their respective assets and property, the
property and funds divided and awarded to them as part of this divorce, their respective income

6

Imputing income of $1,914.00 per month to Ms. Schovaers actually weighs in Mr.
Schovaers'favorsince the Court has found it would be reasonable to impute only $1,649.00 of
income per month to Ms. Schovaers for purposes of determining alimony. See 1flf27-30, f 106.
-27-

levels in light of their reasonable expenses, and the lifestyle enjoyed during their marriage, the
Court determines that it would be equitable, reasonable and proper to set and award Ms.
Schovaers alimony in the amount of $2,000.00 per month. Setting alimony at $2,000.00 per
month would raise Ms. Schovaers" standard of living to approximately what she enjoyed during
the parties' marriage without impacting Mr. Schovaers1 ability to maintain that lifestyle for
himself.
6.

Accordingly, Mr. Schovaers should be ordered to pay Ms. Schovaers $2,000.00

per month for 22 years (264 months) for alimony. However, pursuant to the provisions found in
U.GA. §30-3-5(8) and U.C.A- §30-3-5(9), Mr. Schovaers' obligation to pay alimony to Ms.
Schovaers shall automatically terminate upon Ms. Schovaers' death, re-marriage or cohabitation
with another person.
7.

The parties' home was joint marital property.

8.

The parties' agreed division and allocation of the proceedsfromthe sale of the

home as set forth above in Findings #41, Finding #42 and Exhibit A was reasonable, equitable and
consistent with the Court's anticipated ruling in this matter.
9.

Since the parties' sale and division of those sale proceedsfromthe home were,

reasonable, fair and equitable in light of the circumstances, the Court should issue an order
affirming and approving of the parties" sale of the home and division of the sales proceeds.
10.

To the extent, if any, that Mr. Schovaers has not already paid the various expenses

relating to the parties' home, and except as otherwise dealt with by the parties in their division of
the proceedsfromthe sale of the home, the Court should order Mr. Schovaers to be solely
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responsible for paying any unpaid expenses relating to the home without any right of
reimbursement and/or contributionfromMs. Schovaers, including but not limited to any and all
utilities, repairs, insurance premiums and/or other expenses.
11.

Ms. Schovaers should be awarded all of the property currently in her possession,

free and clear of any claims by Mr. Schovaers.
12.

As to the property listed in Exhibit #21, the Court should award Ms. Schovaers the

property listed in: "Exhibit A" of Exhibit #21; "Exhibit B" of Exhibit #21; and those items of
property identified as "Requested by Petitioner" in Exhibit C of Exhibit #21.
13.

Mr. Schovaers should be ordered to make copies of all of the post-separation

photographs of the parties' children in his possession and deliver copies of those photographs to
Ms. Schovaers.
14.

Mr. Schovaers should be awarded all of the other remaining household personal

property in his possessionfreeand clear of any claims by Ms. Schovaers.
15.

Mr. Schovaers should be awarded the Ford truck and the 2003 Jeep as his sole and

separate property,freeand clear of any claims by Ms. Schovaers, with Mr. Schovaers being solely
responsible for any and all loans, liens and/or expenses relating to such vehicles.
16.

Ms. Schovaers should be awarded the 1999 Jeep as her sole and separate property,

free and clear of any claims by Mr. Schovaers, with Ms. Schovaers being solely responsible for
any and all loans, liens and/or expenses relating to such vehicle.
17.

It was reasonable for the parties to fairly divide and allocate the value of the

vehicles being awarded to them in the distribution of the proceedsfromthe sale of the parties'
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home.
18.

All of the parties1 respective retirement accounts, pensions, profit-sharing plans,

401K plans, and/or other retirement type accounts/assets that have accrued or been acquired
during the course of the parties' marriage up to the date of decree of divorce is entered in this
matter, including but not limited to: the Schovaers Electronics profit sharing plan; the Utah
Systems 401 (k) plan; and the parties' respective IRA's should be allocated and divided equally
between the parties, with each party being awarded one-half of all such retirement assets. The
Court should also issue a Qualified Domestic Relations Order ordering each party's share in such
retirement benefits to be allocated and equally divided between the parties, with the division to be
by an in-kind division of the actual assets of the accounts where possible so as to avoid any
valuation disputes.
19.

The 116 shares of Schovaers Electronics stock should be awarded to Mr.

Schovaers.
20.

Ms. Schovaers should be awarded $12,549.50 from Mr. Schovaers' share of the

net sale proceeds of the parties' home as payment for her share of the parties' joint
bank/investment accounts and it was reasonable for the parties to arrange for the payment of that
amount in the distribution of the proceedsfromthe sale of the parties' home.
21.

Mr. Schovaers should be awarded the promissory notefromhis parents as his sole

and separate property,freeand clear of any claims by Ms. Schovaers.
22.

Except for the 2003 Jeep for which Mr. Schovaers is to be solely responsible and

responsible, the parties appear to have no other debts. To the extent that such debts do exists,
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each party should be ordered to be solely responsible for their own respective debts.
23.

The parties should be ordered to be responsible for their own respective attorney's

fees and court costs.
24.

Ms. Schovaers should be restored to her maiden name of McEntire.

25.

The Court's allocation and division of the parties' assets and debts as set forth

above is fair and equitable.
26.

The Court should enter a Decree of Divorce with orders consistent with the terms

set forth herein, with such decree being issued nunc pro tunc so as to be effective as of December
23, 2003, the entry date of the December Decree which was previously vacated by the Court
However, pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, even though the decree
should be issued nunc pro tunc, the parties should have 30 days from the date this decree is
entered in which to file any notice of appeal.

B Y ORR^?OF THE COURT
aC^MJ^C

DATED: \ o \ z f r \ c H

/ $

C

LESLIE LEWIS
UTAH DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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EXHIBIT A
CALCULATION & DIVISION OF PROCEEDS FROM SALE OF HOME
$303,426.00 Net proceedsfromsale after full payment of mortgage & sales commission
Mr. Schovaers

Ms. Schovaers

$151,713.00

$151,713.00

Half of net sale proceeds

(12,549.50)

12,549.50

Adjustment for division of parties' bank/investment
accounts.

16,424.00

(16,424,00)

Adjustment toreimburseMr. Schovaers for Ms.
Schovaeirs7 half of pre-trial mortgage payments that
were paid by Mr. Schovaers.

1,798.50

(1,798.50)

Adjustment to reimburse Mr. Schovaers for Ms.
Schovaers' half of 2003 property taxes that were
paid by Mr. Schovaers.1

2,165.00

(2,165.00)

Adjustment to reimburse Mr. SchovaersforMs.
Schovaers' half of post-trial mortgage payments that
were paid by Mr. Schovaers.

2,585.00

(2,585.00)

Adjustment for allocation of differing values of the
vehicles that were awarded to the parties.

$162,136.00

$141,290.00

Final Share of Distribution of Home Sale Proceeds

*Ms. Schovaers' payment for her one-half share of the property taxes that Mr. Schovaers
paidfromthe time of separation to the time of trial was credited to Mr. Schovaers when the
Court calculated the division of the parties' bank/investment accounts. See, Finding #48 & #49.
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DECREE OF DIVORCE
Based on the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law (Amended as per Court's
4/20/04 Ruling) that have been made and entered by the Court, THE COURT HEREBY
DECREES AND ORDERS AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Josephine M Schovaers ("Ms. Schovaers") and John C. Schovaers ("Mr

Schovaers") are granted a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences.
2.

Since the parties' child, Anna Schovaers, is now emancipated, the Court need not

make any further orders concerning Anna's custody, visitation and support. However, to the
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extent that the parties have not already paid and satisfied theirfinancialobligations to each other
with respect to Anna while she was a minor, the parties are ordered to pay and satisfy those
obligations.1
3.

Mr. Schovaers is ordered to pay alimony to Ms. Schovaers in the amount of

$2,000.00 per month for the next 22 years (264 months)* However, pursuant to the provisions
found in U.C.A. §30-3-5(8) and U.C.A. §30-3-5(9), Mr. Schovaers' obligation to pay alimony to
Ms. Schovaers shall automatically terminate upon Ms. Schovaers9 death, re-marriage or
cohabitation with another person. In no event shall Mr. Schovaers' alimony obligation to Ms.
Schovaers last longer than 22 years (264 months)fromthe effective date of this Decree.
4.

The Court hereby approves and affirms the parties* sale and agreed division and

allocation of the proceedsfromthe sale of the parties' home as being reasonable, equitable and
consistent with the Court's anticipated ruling in this matter. See, Findings of Fact & Conclusions
ofLawffl41-42.
5.

To the extent, if any, that Mr. Schovaers has not already paid the various expenses

relating to the parties' home, and except as otherwise dealt with by the parties in their division of
the proceedsfromthe sale of the home, Mr. Schovaers is ordered to be solely responsible for

'Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce that was previously entered but later vacated by the
Court, Ms. Schovaers was to pay Mr. Schovaers $187 88 per month for Anna's support until the
later of Anna's 18th birthday or graduationfromhigh school with the payment of that child
support to be made by giving Mr. Schovaers a credit of $187.88 per month against his monthly
alimony/support payments to Ms. Schovaers until the later of Anna's 18th birthday or graduation
from high school. To the extent that Mr. Schovaers has not already taken and applied those
credits, Mr. Schovaers shall be entitled to do so.
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paying any unpaid expenses relating to the home without anyrightof reimbursement and/or
contributionfromMs. Schovaers, including but not limited to any and all unpaid utilities, repairs,
insurance premiums and/or otter expenses.
6.

Ms. Schovaers is hereby awarded all of the property currently in her possession,

free and clear of any claims by Mr. Schovaers.
7.

As to the property listed in Trial Exhibit #21, Ms. Schovaers is awarded all of the

property listed in: "Exhibit A* of Exhibit #21; "Exhibit B" of Exhibit #21; and those items of
property identified as "Requested by Petitioner" in Exhibit C of Exhibit #21.
8.

Mr. Schovaers is ordered to make copies of all of the post-separation photographs

of the parties' children in his possession and deliver copies of those photographs to Ms.
Schovaers within 30 days after the entry of this decree.
9.

Mr. Schovaers is awarded all of the other remaining household personal property

in his possessionfreeand clear of any claims by Ms. Schovaers.
10.

Mr. Schovaers is hereby awarded the Ford truck and the 2003 Jeep as his sole and

separate property, free and clear of any claims by Ms. Schovaers, with Mr. Schovaers being
ordered to be solely responsible for any and all loans, liens and/or expenses relating to such
vehicles.
11.

Ms. Schovaers is hereby awarded the 1999 Jeep as her sole and separate property,

free and clear of any claims by Mr. Schovaers, with Ms. Schovaers being ordered to be solely
responsible for any and all loans, liens and/or expenses relating to such vehicle.
12.

All of the parties' respective retirement accounts, pensions, profit-sharing plans,
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401K plans, and/or other retirement type accounts/assets that have accrued or been acquired
during the course of the parties1 marriage up to the effective date of this decree of divorce
(December 23,2003), including but not limited to: the Schovaers Electronics profit sharing plan;
the Utah Systems 401(k) plan; and the parties' respective IRA's shall be allocated and divided
equally between the parties, with each party being awarded one-half of all such retirement assets.
The Court shall also issue a Qualified Domestic Relations Order(s) ordering each party's share in
such retirement benefits to be allocated and equally divided between the parties, with the division
to be by an in-kind division of the actual assets of the accounts where possible so as to avoid any
valuation disputes.2
13.

The 116 shares of Schovaers Electronics stock are hereby awarded to Mr.

Schovaersfreeand clear of any claims by Ms. Schovaers.
14.

Mr. Schovaers is awarded the promissory notefromhis parents as his sole and

separate property,freeand clear of any claims by Ms. Schovaers.
15.

Except for the 2003 Jeep for which Mr. Schovaers is to be solely responsible and

responsible, the parties appear to have no other debts. To the extent that such debts do exists,
each party is hereby ordered to be solely responsible for their own respective debts.
16.

The parties shall be responsible for their own respective attorney's fees and court

2

If mutually agreed to by both parties, the parties may keep all of the retirement plans
except the Schovaers Electronics profit sharing plan registered as they currently are and then pay
and split their respective one-half interest in all of the plans between themselves by making an
appropriate adjustment to the division of the assets in the Schovaers Electronics profit sharing
plan.
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costs.

17.

Ms. Schovaers is hereby restored to her maiden name of "Josephine McEntire."

18.

This Decree of Divorce and the orders set forth herein are issued nunc pro time so

as to be effective as of December 23,2003, the entry date of the previously vacated findings,
conclusions and decree. Pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the
parties shall have 30 daysfromthe date this Decree of Divorce is actually entered in which to file
any notice of appeal

BY ORDERTOF THE COURT

-J? <
DATED: \ D \ E M P M
LESLIE LEWIS
UTAH DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY/ STATE OP UTAH

JOSEPHINE M. SCHOVAERS,

COURT'S RULING

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 014903735

vs.
JOHN C. SCHOVAERS,
Respondent.

The Court has before it a number of documents which require
this Court's rulings.

First, the Court notes that soon after it

issued its prior Court's Ruling, on April 20, 2004, the respondent
renewed his objection as to one portion of the petitioner's
Proposed

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions

Respondent's Objection, filed on July 8, 2004).

of

Law.

(See

This Objection

pertains to the duration of alimony and the provision for the
termination of alimony in the event of remarriage, cohabitation,
etc. The petitioner responded to this Objection on July 16, 2004.
The respondent filed a Reply on July 20, 2004, which incorporates
alternate language for two of the paragraphs in the proposed
Findings.

On July 22, 2004, the petitioner filed a "Sur-

Response," addressing the proposed changes and arguing that they
are substantive changes of the Court's prior orders. On August 2,
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2004, the respondent objected to the Court's consideration of the
Sur-Response.
Unfortunately, while this matter has been submitted for
decision on several different occasions,, beginning with the filing
of a Notice to Submit on July 16, 2004, it has only recently come
to the Court's attention.

The Court apologizes for the delay in

ruling on this matter.
After the respondent's Objection, the petitioner's Response
and the final Reply (the Court declined to consider the SurResponse), the Court determines that the respondent's Objections
are not well-taken and are therefore denied.

The Court is

satisfied that the petitioner's language concerning the duration of
alimony is proper and should not be altered in the manner proposed
by the respondent.
denied.

Accordingly, the respondent's Objection is

The Court has entered the petitioner's proposed Findings

of Facts & Conclusions of Law (Amended as per Court's 4/20/04
Ruling)

and

Decree

of

Divorce

(With

contemporaneous with this Court's Ruling.

Orders)

on

a

date
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This Court's Ruling will stand as the Order of the Court,
denying the respondent's Objection.
Dated t h i s Z^iclay of October, >2f6Jb4.
/

/

stithy u ^

LESLIE A. LEWIS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Court's Ruling, to the following, this /3l

day of

October, 2004:

Frank N. Call
Attorney for Petitioner
68 S. Main Street, Suite 701
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101
B. L. Dart
Attorney for Respondent
370 E. South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
-oooOOOooo—

RULE,52(b) MOTION TO AMEND
FINDINGS AND RULE 59(a)
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND
RULE 59(E) MOTION TO ALTER
OR AMEND JUDGMENT

JOSEPHINE M. SCHOVAERS.
Petitioner,

v.

Civil No. 014903735

JOHN C. SCHOVAERS,

Judge Lewis
Commissioner Casey

Respondent.
—oooOOOooo--

COMES NOW respondent pursuant to Rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and moves the Court for an Order amending the Findings of Fact which it has adopted
under its Memorandum Decision. Respondent further moves the Court to alter or amend the
ruling of the Memorandum Decision on the issue of alimony and child support pursuant to Rule
59(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 59(a) (6) and (7) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
From a review of the Memorandum Decision is becomes apparent that the Court
did not have available to it respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact at the time it rendered its
decision. There is concern that respondent's Findings of Fact may possibly have been misfiled.

The Memorandum Decision recites that petitioner filed her proposed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law approximately September 16,2003, and the respondent submitted
his proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law approximately September 30,2003. In
fact, respondent submitted his proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the 12th of
September, 2003 and a copy of the cover letter to the Court and a copy of those Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law are attached hereto as Exhibit "A". Thereafter, petitioner's attorney filed
a proposed Decree of Divorce. When respondent's attorney contacted him concerning this,
petitioner's attorney stated that he had had a callfromthe Court and that the Court was desirous
of both counsel providing proposed Decrees of Divorce as well as the proposed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law. Respondent's attorney thereupon submitted to the Court on September
30,2003, his proposed Decree of Divorce and a copy of the cover letter to the Court and a copy
of that proposed Decree of Divorce are attached hereto as Exhibit "B".
It is apparent that the Court in making its decision was reviewing Petitioner's
Proposed Findings of Fact submitted on September 16,2003 and Respondent's Proposed Decree
of Divorce submitted approximately September 30, 2003. This fact becomes obvious where the
Court in paragraph 2 of its legal analysis directs petitioner's attorney to redraft the Findings as to
the residence of the parties and to "incorporate paragraph 5(a) of the respondent's proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.'' As can be seenfromthe attached exhibits, there is no
paragraph 5(a) of respondent's proposed Findings of Fact. The reference is obviously to
paragraph 5(a) of respondent's proposed Decree of Divorce, which relates to the house.
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The problem which is created is that the Court did not have the benefit of
respondent's proposed Findings of Fact which contained the rationale and support for
respondent's positions, particularly as they relate to alimony.
Alimony
In reviewing the Court's analysis as to the issue of alimony, it is apparent that error
has occurred.
Income
In analyzing an award of alimony it is necessary to look at the respective incomes
of the parties. The income of the parties is as follows:
1.

The Court in its Memorandum Decisionfindsthat respondent's gross

monthly income is $4,300 a month.
2.

The Court in its Memorandum Decision directed petitioner's attorney to

incorporate his Findings of Fact which in paragraph 24 finds that petitioner has a gross monthly
incomefromall employment of $1,380 per month. This is contrary to the ruling which was made
by the Court at the close of the evidence at the time of the closing arguments of counsel. A
transcript of the closing arguments has been ordered but to this time has not been received.
Accompanying this Motion, however, is a copy of the tape of the closing arguments.
The Court's statement regarding petitioner's income is found at 8/26/03,11:06.33
a.m. The Court stated,
U

I expect her income to be set at at least what she would be
earning in Salt Lake if she were still teaching here as reflected
on the exhibit that was received and summer income added
into that at the rate of $8.00, so we will use Utah figures."
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The exhibit in question was Exhibit 99, attached hereto as Exhibit "CM and is referenced in
paragraph 9 of respondent's proposed Findings of Fact, showing that petitioner's earnings had she
stayed in Utah as a teacher and had she kept summer employment in Utah, would have been
$2,683 gross monthly income. This is consistent with the Child Support Worksheet prepared
respondent showing a child support amount of $2:58 attached to respondent's proposed Findings
ofFact
Respondent, John Schovaers, simply does not have sufficient income to pay a
$2,000 a month alimony award and, further, the $2,000 alimony award creates a tremendous
inequity between the parties.
Even if the Court were attempting to equalize the income of the parties, there can
be no basis for the award of $2,000 a month in alimony.
The equalization would be as follows:
Petitioner's income:
$ 2,683
Reduction for child support
expenses of Anna:
Alimony to equalize:
Total:

( 258)
$ 2,425)
+ 681
$ 3,106

Respondent's income;
$ 4,300
( 422)
$ 3,787
( 681)
3,106

The effect of the proposed $2,000 a month alimony award is as follows:

Reduction for expenses of Anna:
Alimony
Total Available to Each Party:

Petitioner's income;
$ 2,683
( 258)
$ 2,425)
+ 2,000
$ 4,425
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Respondents income:
$ 4,300
( 422)
$ 3,787
( 2,000)
1,787

Expenses
The Court in awarding alimony must also look to the expenses of the parties.
With regard to expenses, the analysis is as follows:
1.

Respondent's expenses were set forth in his Exhibit 26, reflecting an

amount of $4,137 a month. The Court during trial in reviewing that exhibit made specific findings
that several of those expenses were higher than the Court felt to be appropriate and the Court
made the adjustments shown on respondents Proposed Findings of Fact, paragraph 7, attached, as
follows:
a.

Food should be reducedfrom$700 to $400, a reduction of $300.

b.

Clothing should be reducedfrom$325 to $200, a reduction of

c.

Automobile expenses should be reducedfrom$371 to $271, a

d.

Respondent's purchase of an automobile at a cost of $511 a month

$125.

reduction of $100.

was found to be excessive but the Court found that he was in need of an additional vehicle since
the pickup truck he was driving had 191,000 miles on it and was in poor condition. The Court at
that time indicated that respondent could have financed transportation at a lesser cost of $250 a
month, which would be a reduction off the amount claimed by respondent of $261 a month.
The total of these adjustments is $786, leaving respondent with reasonable
living expenses of $3,351 a month for him and the minor daughter, Anna.
The Court has now changed its position if it accepts petitioner's Finding of
Fact 98, which would pare those expenses back to $2,189 a month.
5

2.

Petitioner1 s only statement of expenses ever filed were introduced as

Exhibit 98, reflecting monthly expenses of $ 1,743. Petitioner did testify that the parties did have a
higher standard of living during the marriage but there was never a time that that amount was
quantified by petitioner during the trial or even under petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 89 tp
establish what that standard of living was.
It is difficult to understand how the Court couldfindthat petitioner's
expenses are any more than the $2,189 it is proposing are the reasonable expenses of respondent
and the minor daughter, Anna
The Court in its Memorandum Decision stated,
"Therefore, after evaluating the parties' total financial
picture and taking into account their respective income
levels and in light of their reasonable expenses and the
lifestyles enjoyed during their marriage, the Court
determines that alimony is property set at $2,000 a month/'
The problem with this ruling is that even if the Court does find that the
lifestyle of the parties during the marriage is higher than their current lifestyles, there was never a
quantification of what that lifestyle was and, more important, there is no money to make an
alimony payment. Respondent does not have a sufficient income to meet his own expenses and
make an alimony payment in that amount.
It is because petitioner's ability to earn an income exceeds her current
needs that respondent has taken the position that no alimony should be paid.
The Court's finding that "alimony in the amount of $2,000 would raise the
petitioner's standard of living to approximately what she enjoyed during the parties' marriage,"
cannot be made in a vacuum and has to be made in the context of respondent's ability to provide
6

support. Rehn v. Rehn. 974 P.2d 306 (1999 Court of Appeals). In this case there simply isn't
$2,000 available.
The simple fact is that neither party is going to be able to live to the
lifestyle that existed during the marriage. There will need to be a belt tightening on the part of
both parties.
Child Support
Based upon the amount of income which the Court has imputed to each of the
parties, the appropriate amount of child support is the sum of $258 a month as reflected on the
Child Support Worksheet attached to respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact.
It is respectfully requested that the Court reconsider its rulings regarding alimony
and child support based upon the foregoing.
DATED this 13th day of November, 2003.

ty

/ / , /
/ / / '
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B. L. DART

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 13* day of November, 2003,1 mailed a copy of the
foregoing to:
Frank N. Call
Attorney for Petitioner
68 South Main Street, #701
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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The Honorable Leslie A. Lewis
District Court Judge
450 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Re:

Schovaers v. Schovaers; Civil No. 014903735

Dear Judge Lewis:
Pursuant to your instructions, I am enclosing our proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law in this case*
It is my understanding that Frank Call is still in the process of preparing his
Findings and, hopefully, will have them to you shortly.
/)

B.L.Dart
BLD/skm
Enclosure
cc:

John Schovaers
Frank Call

B.L. DART (818)
DART, ADAMSON, & DONOVAN
370 East South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 521-6383
Attorneys for Respondent
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
—-oooOooo—
JOSEPHINE ML SCHOVAERS,

:

RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

:

Case No. 014903735

:

Hon. Leslie Lewis
Comm T. Patrick Casey

Petitioner,
v.

:

JOHN C. SCHOVAERS,
Respondent.

—oooOooo—
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on Monday, the 25* day of August
and Tuesday, the 26th day of August, 2003, Petitioner appearing in person and by her attorney
Frank N. Call, and Respondent appearing in person and by his attorney B. L. Dart, and the Court
having heard testimonyfromwitnesses and having received exhibits and various stipulations and
the matter having been argued and submitted, the Court hereby makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Petitioner and Respondent were both residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah,

for the three month period immediately prior to thefilingof this action for divorce.
2.

Petitioner and Respondent were married in Salt Lake City on the 15* day of May,

1979, and since that time have been husband and wife.
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3.

Differences have now arisen between the parties which the Courtfindsare

irreconcilable, and each of the parties should be awarded a decree of divorcefromthe other on
the grounds of irreconcilable differences to becomefinalupon signing and entry.
4.

Petitioner and Respondent have two children as issue of this marriage: Aundrea,

age 22, who is an adult and emancipated, and Anna, age 17, bora January 29,1986. The parties
should be awarded the joint legal custody of Anna with her physical residence to be with
Respondent and with Petitioner to have visitation with Anna as regularly as can be arranged
without forcing Anna to engage in visitation contrary to her desires.
Respondent should encourage and facilitate a relationship between Anna and
Petitioner and Petitioner should consider engaging in counseling to repair the relationship between
her and Anna.
5.

Petitionerfiledwith the Court her statement of monthly expenses, introduced as

Exhibit 98, reflecting monthly expenses of $1,743 a month. Even though the Exhibit reflects
$183 for credit card charges which were for clothing and gasoline otherwise shown on the
Exhibit, the Courtfindsthat this is not a duplication and furtherfindsthat the monthly expenses of
$1,743 for Petitioner are reasonable.
6.

Petitioner testified that her living expenses during the marriage were substantially

higher but failed to quantify what those expenses were on a monthly basis except to say that she
feels she should have an alimony award of $2,500. The Courtfindsthat this claim is not
supported by the evidence either as to her established need or Respondent's ability to meet an
alimony award in that amount.
7.

Respondent introduced Exhibit 26 setting forth his monthly expenses for himself

and the minor daughter of the parties, Anna, in the amount of $4,137 a month. The Court in
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reviewing this Exhibitfindsthat several of these expenses are higher than the Court feels
appropriate and would make the following adjustments:
a.

Food should be reducedfrom$700 to $400, a reduction of $300.

b.

Clothing should be reducedfrom$325 to $200, a reduction of $125.

c.

Automobile expenses should be reduced from $371 to $271, a reduction of

d.

Respondent within the month before the divorce trial purchased a Jeep

$100.

automobile which wasfinancedat a cost of $511 a month which the Courtfindsis excessive. The
Court doesfindthat Respondent was in need of an additional vehicle to meet the needs of
Respondent and Anna, particularly since the only other vehicle was a pickup truck with 191,000
miles on it and in poor condition. The Courtfindsthat Respondent could have financed
transportation at a lesser cost of $250 a month, which would be a reduction off the amount
claimed by Respondent of $261 a month.
e.

The total of these adjustments is $786, which when deducted from

Respondent's Statement of Monthly Expenses at $4,137 leaves $3,351 a month in expenses which
the Courtfindsto be reasonable for the living expenses of Respondent and the minor daughter,
Anna.
8.

Petitioner returned to school and obtained a bachelor's degree in 1998, She

thereupon took employment in the Granite School District as a full-time teacher followed by
employment in the Jordan School District as a full-time teacher. In the 1999 year, Petitioner
earned incomefromher employment with Jordan School District of $20,038 as reflected on her
1999 W-2 attached to the joint tax return of the parties introduced as Exhibit 35. Petitioner
thereafter voluntarily reduced her employment to part-time employment, and approximately a year
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following thefilingof this action for divorce, Petitioner voluntarily terminated her employment
with Jordan School District and moved to the State of Washington. Since she has been in the
State of Washington, Petitioner has been unsuccessful infindingemployment as a teacher based
upon the current lack of teaching positions in Washington Petitioner's decision to teach only
part-time and her further decision to go to the State of Washington where employment as a
teacher is not currently available were voluntary decisions which have created a current underemployment which cannot be the basis of establishing her income potential for alimony purposes,
9.

Respondent introduced Exhibit 99 which shows that a teacher with a bachelor's

level degree having taughtfiveyears in Jordan School District would be earning between $28,065
and $29,377 for the 9-month school year, and the Courtfindsthat this is an amount that
Petitioner could be earning as a teacher if she had not voluntarily terminated her employment and
moved to Washington. The Court uses the lowerfigureof $28,065. The teaching position is a
9-month position There was further testimony that Petitioner who has experience as a
department store sales clerk could earn income at $8.00 as a cleric an hour consistent with her
former employment with Meier & Frank in Salt Lake City. Assuming 40 hours a week at $8.00
an hour for the three months of the year, Petitioner could earn additional income of $4,128 a year.
When the teaching employment and sales clerk employment are added together, the Court finds
that Petitioner could earn a gross annual income of $32,193 or $2,683 gross monthly income.
10.

Respondent is currently employed at Schovaers Electronics and his income is

reflected on his pay stub introduced as Exhibit 25 which shows that he earns $2,150 per twicemonthly pay period or $4,300 gross per month, which is $51,600 gross per year. Respondent's
current monthly take-home income after deducting federal and state taxes, FICA and Medicare is
$1J00 twice a month or $3,400 net per month.
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11.

Petitioner claims that Respondent has historically earned a higher income and in

fact prior to the year 2001 was receiving a gross salary of $68,400 a year or $5,700 a month.
This salary was based upon Respondent working extensive amounts of overtime, which was made
possible by petitioner taking care of the house and children. His testimony was that he worked
65-70 hours a week. Petitioner's testimony was; that he was working 60 hours per week.
When Petitioner left, Respondent reduced his hours of employment to be able to
cover the needs of the minor daughter of the parties and his new household responsibilities and he
is currently working 50 hours a week for his current salary. The Courtfindsthat it would not be
appropriate to base either child support or alimony on Respondent's historical income at a work
level so far in excess of full-time employment. The Courtfindsthat a reasonable amount to be
used for Respondent's income for child support and alimony purposes is his current income of
$51,600 a year or $4,300 a month.
12.

Attached hereto is a Child Support Worksheet based upon the parties' respective

abilities to earn income. Based upon this Worksheet which assumes a gross income to
Respondent of $4,300 a month and a gross income to Petitioner of $2,683, Petitioner should pay
to Respondent child support of $258 a month commencing with the month of September, 2003
and continuing until such time as Anna reaches the age of 18 and has graduatedfromhigh school
in ordinary course, whichever occurs later.
While Petitioner has a legal obligation for child support for Anna, in view of the
Court's analysis on alimony, hereinafter set forth, and in view of the present financial
circumstances of the parties, andfinallyin view of the fact that Anna will graduatefromhigh
school within the upcoming school year, the Courtfindsthat any obligation for child support
should be abated based upon the alimony ruling hereinafter set forth.

5

13.

In evaluating Petitioner's claim for alimony, the Court is required to look at three

factors. These are Petitioner's need for alimony, Petitioner's ability to meet that need, and
Respondent's ability to pay alimony to assist in meeting Petitioner's need. As to these three
factors, the Courtfindsas follows:
a.

Petitioner has established that her reasonable monthly expenses are the sum

of $1,743 as stated in paragraph 5 above. There is no other creditable evidence to establish a
different figure.
b.

As stated above, the Courtfindsthat Petitioner has the capacity to earn a

gross monthly income of $2,683 a month.
c.

As stated above, Respondent's gross monthly income is $4,300 and his net

monthly expendable income is $3,400. Against this, he has reasonable monthly expenses for
himself and the minor daughter of the parties which the Court finds to be $3,351 per month as
stated in paragraph 7 above.
When the foregoing analysis is made, the Courtfindsthat Petitioner is currently
capable of earning an income suflBcient to meet her monthly needs. Respondent after meeting his
monthly needs and the needs of the minor daughter has no income above expenses with which to
make payment of alimony
Based upon the foregoing analysis, the Courtfindsthat Petitioner should be
awarded no alimonyfromRespondent based upon the currentfinancialcircumstances of the
parties.
14.

The property of the parties should be awarded as follows with the award to each

party to befreeof any claim of the other:
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a.

Real Estate. The house and real property at 1888 Spring Lane, Sak Lake

City, Utah, should be listed by the parties for sale within the next two weeks with an agent of their
mutual choosing and at a price on which they mutually agree. If the parties are unable to agree
upon a listing agent, they are each to forthwith provide the Court with the names of two real
estate agents and the Court will then make a decisionfromthe four names given or of the Court's
own choosing. If the parties are unable to agree upon a listing price, then the home should be
appraised immediately by Jerry Webber with each party to bear one-half the cost of the appraisal.
The listing price will then be at the appraisal figure.
Upon hs sale, the proceeds of the house are to be paid as follows:
(1)

To cover the then existing mortgage balance owing on the

(2)

To cover all the expenses related to the sale including the sales

property;

commission and any closing costs or accrued maintenance such as property taxes;
(3)

To reimburse Respondent for mortgage payments which he has

made on the home since the separation of the parties at the rate of $1,550 a monthfromMay,
2001 through October, 2002 and $619 a monthfromthe month of January, 2003 to the time of
actual sale.
(4)

The remaining sales proceeds should be divided equally between the

parties
b.

Credits claimed by Respondent. Respondent asserted claims for various

credits in the amount of $63,374 as set forth on his Exhibit 4. The Courtfindsthat while these
funds may have been either premarital or giftedfromhis parents, they nonetheless were put into a
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joint account of the parties and then into the joint home of the parties, and the Court therefore
finds that they have been comingled and no longer have their separate identity.
c.

Schovaers Electronics

The Courtfindsthat the 116 shares of stock

in Schovaers Electronics was gifted to Respondent by his parents as shown in Exhibit 5, which
were the letters of gift to respondent.
Petitioner asserted an interest in this stock based upon her claim that she
had been working at Schovaers Electronics before her marriage to respondent and upon her
marriage to respondent she continued to work but at no pay. In response to this claim,
respondent produced the payroll book for the year 1979, the year in which the parties were
married. This payroll book reflects that petitioner continued to be paid after the marriage of the
parties in May of 1999, contrary to her recall.
Based upon the foregoing the Courtfindsthat the stock in Schovaers
Electronics should be awarded to respondentfreeof any claim of petitioner.
d.

Schovaers Investments. The Courtfindsthat this was a limited

partnership created by Respondent's parents as an estate-planning device. The only asset which
Respondent has receivedfromthis Investment is $6,000 paid early in the year of 2003 and a
prospective promissory note issued in 2003 providing for payments to be made in the fature The
Court finds that Schovaers Investments including the $6,000 payment and the promissory note is
a gifted, non-marital asset which was not acquired through the efforts of the parties or received
during the time the parties were together and should be awarded to Respondentfreeof any claim
ofPetitioner.
e.

Bank Accounts. At the time of closing arguments, the parties reviewed

the bank and investment accounts existing at the time of the parties* separation and came to the

8

conclusion that an equitable adjustment of these accounts would result in each of the parties being
awarded their current accounts and Petitioner being awarded a property settlement from
Respondent in the amount of $11,049 which should be paid by Respondent to Petitioner at such
time as the house and real property is sold out of his portion of the sales proceeds and after an
adjustment for the property settlement set forth in paragraph 16 below.
f.

Retirement Accounts. The parties have various retirement accounts

including the following:
(1)

Petitioner has a Utah Retirement Systems 401(k), a Utah

Retirement Systems Defined Benefit Plan, and a Paine Webber IRA.
(2)

Respondent has a Schovaers Electronics Profit Sharing Retirement

Plan and a Paine Webber IRA.
These Plans are to be divided equally between the parties pursuant to the
terms of Qualified Domestic Relations Orders and each party should receive one-half the benefit
of each Plan and be responsible for any tax liability attributable to his or her respective portions.
g.

Life Insurance. Respondent has a term life insurance policy with Jackson

National Life which has no marital value and which should be awarded to Respondent.
1L

Mediation Fee. Respondent paid the full mediation fee of the parties and

should receive credit against the division of marital assets in the amoimt of this fee in the sum of
$680.
i.

Vehicles.
(1)

Petitioner will be awarded the 1999 Jeep Grand Cherokee Laredo

which the Courtfindshas a marital value of $11,175,
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(2)

Respondent will be awarded the 2004 Jeep Grand Cherokee which

he purchased within the month prior to the divorce trial and which the Courtfindshas no equity.
(3)

Respondent will be awarded the 1993 Ford F250 pickup truck

which the Courtfindshas a marital value of $1,500.
j.

Personal Property. Based upon the stipulation of the parties the personal

property if the parties will be awarded in accordance with Respondent's Exhibit 21 and the lists
attached thereto as follows with no values ascribed:
(1)

Petitioner will be awarded items listed on Exhibit "A" which if in

the possession of Respondent will be given to Petitioner,
(2)

Petitioner will be awarded items listed on Exhibit "B" which are

items she took with her and are currently in her possession;
(3)

Respondent will be awarded items listed on Exhibit "C* which are

currently in his possession except to the extent that any of those items are listed in Petitioner's
requested items on Exhibit UA".
(4)

Respondent has the family photographs and Petitioner has the

negatives up to the time of the parties' separation, and the parties stipulated that this was a fair
division of these photographs. Respondent should be ordered to provide Petitioner with copies
of photos taken of the daughters of the parties since the separation to the time of trial.
15.

Based upon the foregoing awards, the division of marital property between the

parties is as follows:
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JOSEPHINE

1888 Spring Lane, Salt Lake City, UT
House to be listed and sold and proceeds divided after
payment of mortgage, sales commission and closing costs,
accrued property taxes, and reimbursement to Respondent
for mortgage payments madefromthe time of separation
to the time of sale with the remainder to be divided
equally

One-half

JOHN

One-half

BUSINESS INTEREST
Schovaers Electronics, 116 shares
Schovaers Investments

BANK AND INVESTMENT ACCOIINTS
Treasury Credit Union #1424 (Josephine)
Bank of America #69907749 (Josephine)
US Bank, checking #153150249339 (John)
Paine Webber #FP 1481432 (Joint)
US Bank #253100058986 (Custodial account for Anna)
Schwab #4134-8210
(Custodial account for Aundrea and Anna)
RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS (Divide all by QDRO)
Utah Retirement Systems 401(k) (Josephine)

One-half

One-half

Utah Retirement Systems, Defined Benefit Plan
(Josephine)

One-half

One-half

Paine Webber IRA (Josephine)

One-half

One-half

Schovaers Electronics Profit Sharing Plan (John)

One-half

One-half

Paine Webber IRA #FP 1453332 (John)

One-half

One-half
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JOSEPHINE

JOHN

LIFE INSURANCE
Jackson National Life #0017206120 (no cash value)

PERSONAL PROPERTY AND MISCELLANEOUS
2004 Jeep Grand Cherokee (John)
Financed 100%; no equity

-0-

1999 Jeep Grand Cherokee Laredo 4WD (Josephine)

11,175

Value per NADA trade-in
1993 Ford Truck F250 - Salvage value only

1,500

Furniture and furnishings (divided per Exhibit 21)

Divided

Divided

Credit for mediation fee paid to Marcie Keck

(680)

TOTALS

$11,175

NET DISTRIBUTION

16.

$820

($5,177)

$5,177

$5,998

$5,997

Based upon the accounting set forth in paragraph 15 above, the Court finds

that in order to equalize the property award between the parties, petitioner should pay to
respondent $5,177, which should be treated as a credit by respondent in the payment of his
obligation set forth in paragraph 14(e) above on the bank account, which will reduce that
obligation to the net amount of $5,872 and paid in the manner setforthin paragraph 14(e),
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17.

Petitioner has requested and should be restored to her maiden name of

McEntire and to be known hereafter as Josephine McEntire.
18.

Based upon the facts and circumstances of this case and the evidence

presented to the Court, the Courtfindsthat each pany should pay and be responsible for their
own attorney's fees and costs incurred in the prosecution of this divorce action.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Each of the parties is entitled to a Decree of Divorce, onefromthe other,

on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, which Decree shall becomefinalupon signing and
entry.
2.

The custody of and visitation with Anna shall be as set forth in paragraph 4

of the Findings of Fact.
3.

Petitioner shall be ordered to pay child support to respondent in an amount

and upon the terms set forth in paragraph 12 of the Findings of Fact.
4.

No alimony shall be awarded to petitioner.

5.

The property of the parties shall be awarded as set forth in paragraphs 14

and 15 of the Findings of Fact.
6.

Respondent shall be awarded a property settlementfrompetitioner in an

amount and upon the terms set forth in paragraph 16 of the Findings of Fact.
7.

Petitioner shall be restored to her maiden name of Josephine McEntire.
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8.

Each party is ordered to execute any documents and perform any acts

necessary to effectuate the terms of the Decree of Divorce to be entered hereon
DATED this

day of September, 2003
BY THE COURT:

LESLIE LEWIS
District Court Judge
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B. L. DAK1 (818)
ART, ADAMSON DONOVAN
Attorneys for Respondent
370 East South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)521-6383
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOSEPHINE M. SCHOVAERS,
Petitioner,

CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET
(SOLE CUSTODY AND PATERNITY)

v,
JOHNC SCHOVAERS,

Civil No. 014903735
Respondent.

Hon Leslie Lewis

MOTHER

FATHER

COMBINED

1 Enter the # of natural and adopted children of this mother and father for whom
support is to be awarded.

2

2a. Enter the father's and mother's gross monthly income. Refer to Instructions
for definition of income

$2,683

$4,300

2b. Enter previously ordered alimony that is actually paid. (Do not enter alimony
ordered for this case).
2c. Enter previously ordered child support. (Do not enter obligations ordered for
the children in Line 1).

^MH|^H

2d, OPTIONAL: Enter the amount from Line 12 of the Children in Present Home
Worksheet for either parent.
3, Subtract Lines 2b, 2c, and 2d from 2a This is the Adjusted Gross Income for
child support purposes.

$2,683

5. Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in Line 4 by die COMBINED
adjusted monthly gross in Line 3

$258

7. BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD: Bring down the amount(s) from Line 6
or enter the amount(s) from the Low Income table per U C A 78-45-7 7. The
parent(s) without physical custody of the child(ren) pay(s) the amount(s) all 12
1 months of the year.

$258.00

9.

Is the support award the same as guideline amount in Line 7?
If NO, enter the amount ordered. $
(Father)
$

10

( X ) Mother

( ) Father

What were the reasons stated by the Court for the deviation9
i ) property settlement
( ) excessive debts of the marriage
( ) absence of need of the custodial parent

( ) Yes

$6,983

$680

0.62

0.38

6, Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each parent to obtain each parent's share of the
Base Support Obligation,

Which parent is the obligor 7

$4,300

^^^^^ai

4. Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3 and the number of children in Line 1 to
the Support Table Find the Base Combined Support Obligation. Enter it here.

8.

!

$422

H
( )Both

( ) No
(Mother) and answer Number 10=

INCOME HISTORY AND CAPACITY OF PETITIONER

In 1999, Petitioner was a fiill-time teacher for 9 months at a salary
of $20,038. See Exhibit UA" attached.
If Petitioner had remained as a full-time teacher in the Jordan
School District, her pay at this time would be between $28,065 and
$29,377 - See Exhibit UBW attached

$28,065

Petitioner has been employed in Salt Lake and now in Washington
State as a sales. While working as a clerk in Salt Lake, she earned
$8.00 an hour. Assuming she worked the remaining 3 months of
the year while not teaching at 40 hours per week at $8.00 an hour,
this would generate an additional income of $4,128

4,128

TOTAL ANNUAL INCOME

AVERAGE MONTHLY INCOME

$32,193

$2,683

LAW OFFICES

DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN

B L- DART, P C

370 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE. SUITE 4 0 0

CRAIQ O ADAMSON P C
SHARON A DONOVAN, P C

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111-1255

JOHN 0 SHEAFPER J« , P C
CBIC P LCC, P C

m o i l 521-3383
r A « <eOl> 3 5 5 - 2 5 1 3

OF COUNSEL

LORI W NELSON, P C

KCNT M, HASTING, P C

CRAIG A HOQGAN P C

ttJM M MoQOGGOR. P C

A M Y C HAYES

O RANDALL TRUCSLOOO, P C

M KEVIN JONCS

September 30, 2003

The Honorable Leslie A. Lewis
District Court Judge
450 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Re:

Schovaers v. Schovaers; Civil No. 014903735

Dear Judge Lewis:
I was informed by Frank Call that the Court is desirous of both counsel providing
Proposed Decrees of Divorce as well as the Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
previously submitted.
Enclosed for your consideration is our Proposed Decree of Divorce.
Yours very truly,

B. L. Dart
BLD/skm
Enclosure
cc:

John Schovaers
Frank Call

B. L. DART (818)
DART, ADAMSON, & DONOVAN
370 East South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 521-6383
Attorneys for Respondent
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
—oooOooo—
JOSEPHINE M. SCHOVAERS,

RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED
DECREE OF DIVORCE

Petitioner,

:

JOHN C. SCHOVAERS,

:

Case No. 014903735

:

Hon. Leslie Lewis
Comm. T. Patrick Casey

v.

Respondent.

—oooOooo—
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on Monday, the 25th day of August
and Tuesday, the 26th day of August, 2003, Petitioner appearing in person and by her attorney
Frank N. Call, and Respondent appearing in person aad by his attorney B. L. Dart, and the Court
having heard testimony from witnesses and having received exhibits and various stipulations and
the matter having been argued and submitted, and the Court having made and entered its Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now, therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Each of the parties is awarded a Decree of Divorce, one from the other,

on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, which Decree shall become final upon signing and
entry.

1

2.

Petitioner and Respondent have two children as issue of this marriage:

Aundrea, age 22, who is an adult and emancipated, and Anna, age 17, born January 29,1986,
The parties are awarded the joint legal custody of Anna with her physical residence to be with
Respondent and with Petitioner to have visitation with Anna as regularly as can be arranged
without forcing Anna to engage in visitation contrary to her desires.
Respondent shall encourage and facilitate a relationship between Anna and
Petitioner and Petitioner shall consider engaging in counseling to repair the relationship between
her and Anna.
3.

It is ordered that any obligation petitioner has to pay child support is

abated based upon the alimony ruling hereinafter set forth.
4.

Petitioner is awarded no alimonyfromRespondent

5.

The property of the parties is awarded as follows with the award to

each party to befreeof any claim of the other:
a.

Real Estate. The house and real property at 1888 Spring Lane,

Salt Lake City, Utah, shall be listed by the parties for sale within the next two weeks with an
agent of their mutual choosing and at a price on which they mutually agree. If the parties are
unable to agree upon a listing agent, they are each to forthwith provide the Court with the names
of two real estate agents and the Court will then make a decisionfromthe four names given or of
the Court's own choosing If the parties are unable to agree upon a listing price, then the home
shall be appraised immediately by Jerry Webber with each party to bear one-half the cost of the
appraisal The listing price will then be at the appraisal figure.
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Upon its sale, the proceeds of the house are to be paid as follows:
(1)

To cover the then existing mortgage balance owing

(2)

To cover all the expenses related to the sale including the

on the property;

sales commission and any closing costs or accrued maintenance such as property taxes;
(3)

To reimburse Respondent for mortgage payments which he

has made on the home since the separation of the parties at the rate of $1,550 a monthfromMay,
2001 through October, 2002 and $619 a monthfromthe month of January, 2003 to the time of
actual sale.
(4)

The remaining sales proceeds shall be divided equally

between the parties
b.

Credits claimed by Respondent. Respondent's claims for various credits

in the amount of $63,374 is denied as these funds have been commingled and no longer have their
separate identity.
c.

Schovaers Electronics.

The stock in Schovaers Electronics is

awarded to respondent free of any claim of petitioner.
d.

Schovaers Investments. The Schovaers Investments including the $6,000

payment and the promissory note is a gifted, non-marital asset which was not acquired through
the efforts of the parties or received during the time the parties were together and is awarded to
Respondent free of any claim of Petitioner.

3

e.

Bank Accounts Each of the parties is awarded their current accounts and

Petitioner being awarded a property settlementfromRespondent in the amount of $11,049 which
should be paid by Respondent to Petitioner at such time as the house and real property is sold out
of his portion of the sales proceeds and after an adjustment for the property settlement set forth in
paragraph 7 below,
f.

Retirement Accounts. The parties have various retirement accounts

including the following:
(1)

Petitioner has a Utah Retirement Systems 401(k), a Utah

Retirement Systems Defined Benefit Plan, and a Paine Webber IRA.
(2)

Respondent has a Schovaers Electronics Profit Sharing Retirement

Plan and a Paine Webber IRA.
These Plans shall be divided equally between the parties pursuant to the
terms of Qualified Domestic Relations Orders and each party shall receive one-half the benefit of
each Plan and be responsible for any tax liability attributable to his or her respective portions.
g-

Life Insurance. Respondent has a term life insurance policy with Jackson

National Life which has no marital value and which is awarded to Respondent.
h.

Mediation Fee. Respondent paid the full mediation fee of the parties and

shall receive credit against the division of marital assets in the amount of this fee in the sum of
$680.
i.

Vehicles.
(1)

Petitioner is awarded the 1999 Jeep Grand Cherokee

Laredo which the Courtfindshas a marital value of $ 11,175
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(2)

Respondent is awarded the 2004 Jeep Grand Cherokee

which he purchased within the month prior to the divorce trial and which the Courtfindshas no
equity.
(3)

Respondent is awarded the 1993 Ford F250 pickup truck

at a marital value of $ 1,500.
j.

Personal Property The personal property if the parties is awarded in

accordance with Respondent's Exhibit 21 and the lists attached thereto as follows with no values
ascribed:
(1)

Petitioner is awarded items listed on Exhibit "A" which if in the

possession of Respondent will be given to Petitioner,
(2)

Petitioner is awarded items listed on Exhibit "B" which are items

she took with her and are currently in her possession;
(3)

Respondent is awarded items listed on Exhibit "C" which are

currently in his possession except to the extent that any of those items are listed in Petitioner's
requested items on Exhibit "A".
(4)

Respondent has the family photographs and Petitioner has

the negatives up to the time of the parties' separation, and this was a fair division of these
photographs, Respondent is ordered to provide Petitioner with copies of photos taken of the
daughters of the parties since the separation to the time of trial.
6.

The division of marital property between the parties as set forth above is as

follows:

5

JOSEPHINE

1888 Spring Lane, Salt Lake City, UT
House to be listed and sold and proceeds divided after
payment of mortgage, sales commission and closing costs,
accrued property taxes, and reimbursement to Respondent
for mortgage payments madefromthe time of separation
to the time of sale with the remainder to be divided
equally.

One-half

One-half

BUSINESS INTEREST
Schovaers Electronics, 116 shares
Schovaers Investments

BANK AND INVESTMENT ACCOUNTS
Treasury Credit Union #1424 (Josephine)
Bank of America #69907749 (Josephine)
US Bank, checking #153150249339 (John)
Paine Webber #FP 1481432 (Joint)
US Bank #253100058986 (Custodial account for Anna)
Schwab #4134-8210
(Custodial account for Aundrea and Anna)

RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS (Divide all by QDRO)
Utah Retirement Systems 401(k) (Josephine)

One-half

One-half

Utah Retirement Systems, Defined Benefit Plan
(Josephine)

One-half

One-half

Paine Webber IRA (Josephine)

One-half

One-half

Schovaers Electronics Profit Sharing Plan (John)

One-half

One-half

Paine Webber IRA #FP 1453332 (John)

One-half

One-half
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JOSEPHINE

JOHN

LEE INSURANCE
Jackson National Life #0017206120 (no cash value)

—

PERSONAL PROPERTY AND MISCELLANEOUS
2004 Jeep Grand Cherokee (John)
Financed 100%; no equity

-0-

1999 Jeep Grand Cherokee Laredo 4WD (Josephine)

11,175

Value per NADA trade-in
1993 Ford Truck F250 - Salvage value only

1,500

Furniture and furnishings (divided per Exhibit 21)

Divided

Credit for mediation fee paid to Marcie Keck

(680)

TOTALS

$11,175

NET DISTRIBUTION
7.

Divided

$820

($5,177)

$5,177

$5,998

$5,997

In order to equalize the property award between the parties, petitioner

is ordered to pay to respondent $5,177, which shall be treated as a credit by respondent in the
payment of his obUgation set forth in paragraph 5(e) above on the bank account, which will
reduce that obligation to the net amount of $5,872 .and paid in the manner set forth in paragraph
5(e).
8.

Petitioner is restored to her maiden name of McEntire and to be known

hereafter as Josephine McEntire.
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9.

Each party is ordered to pay and be responsible for their own attorney's

fees and costs incurred in the prosecution of this divorce action.

8

10.

Each party is ordered to execute any documents and perform any acts

necessary to effectuate the terms of this Decree of Divorce.
DATED this

day of October, 2003
BY THE COURT:

LESLIE LEWIS
District Court Judge
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Frank N. Call, (U.S.B. #6846)
68 South Main Street, Suite 701
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Phone Number: (801) 532-9909
Attorney for Petitioner, Josephine M. Schovaers

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
JN & FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOSEPHINE M. SCHOVAERS,
Petitioner,
vs.
JOHN C SCHOVAERS
Respondent.

]1
)
])
)
]l

Petitioner's Opposition to Respondent's
Rule 52(b) Motion to Amend Findings
and Role 59(a) Motion for a New Trial
and Rale 59(E) Motion to Alter or
Amend Judgment

]I
)
1

Case #014903735
Judge Leslie Lewis
Commissioner Casey

Petitioner, Josephine M. Schovaers ("Ms. Schovaers"), ty an( i through her attorney Frank
N. Call,filesthis as her opposition to the Rule 52(b) Motion to Amend Findings and Rule 59(a)
Motion for a New Trial and Rule 59(E) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (the "Motions") that
has beenfiledby the Respondent, John C. Schovaers ("Respondent").
OPPOSITION
L

RESPONDENT'S MOTION SHOULD BE DENIED BECAUSE THERE ARE NO
GROUNDS JUSTIFYING A NEW TRIAL OR THE AMENDMENT OF THE
COURT'S JUDGMENT.
In his Motions, Respondent claims the Court should amended its judgment and rulings in

this matter and/or grant Respondent a new trial because, when the Court issued its rulings, the

Court did not have the benefit of Respondent's proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law (hereinafter referred to as the '"Respondent's proposed Findings & Conclusions") which
contained the rationale and support for Respondent's positions, particularly as they relate to
alimony. Motions, p.3. Respondent's assertion that the Court did not have or consider
Respondent's proposed Findings & Conclusions when making its decision in this case is based
solely on thefeetthat f2 of the Court's Memorandum Decision instructs Ms. Schovaers to
amended her proposedfindingsand conclusions so as to incorporate "paragraph 5(a)" of
Respondent's proposed Findings & Conclusions, but thefindingsof feet section of Respondent's
proposed Findings & Conclusions does not have a paragraph numbered "5(a)," and f5 of findings
of feet section of the Respondent's proposed Findings & Conclusions relate to matters other than
the allocation and division of the parties' home or real property. Motions* p.2.
For the reasons set forth below, Respondent's claim and arguments are without merit and

appear to be nothing more than an attempt by Respondent to reargue and contest the Court's

v

<v \ r
>

^i/'

rulings. First, and most importantly, the Court's Memorandum Decision clemly md expressly
states that the Court received Respondent's proposed Findings & Conclusions on about
September 30,2003 and that the Court had "carefully considered" both party's respective
proposedfindingsand conclusions before issuing its ruling on October 30,2003. Memorandum
Decision, p.l. Thus, Respondent's assertion that the Court did not have or consider
Respondent's proposed Findings & Conclusions when making its decision is directly contrary to
the Court's own express statement that the Court had infeetreceived and considered
Respondent's proposed Findings & Conclusions before making its decision in this matter. Since

-2-
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the Court has already expressly stated that it had received and considered Respondent's proposed
Findings & Conclusions before making its decision, the Court should deny the Respondent's
Motions.
Next, f2 of the Court's Memorandum Decision states and reads as follows:
The petitioner discusses the parties' house and real property at 1888 Spring Lane,
Salt Lake City, Utah in Findings Nos. 33 through 41. The petitioner is to re-draft
these Findingsfirstto simplify them and second, to incorporate paragraph 5(a) of
the respondent's proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, The Court
concludes that the respondent's version in this respect is the more accurate version
of the Court's ruling on the house and the division of the proceeds upon sale of the
house. [Petitioner's] Conclusions of Law should be similarly edited. (Emphasis
added).
Although it is true that f5 of thefindingsof feet section of Respondent's proposed Findings &
Conclusions does not address the division of the parties' house or real property, ^[5 of the
conclusions of law section of the Respondent's proposed Findings & Conclusions specifically
address the division of the parties' house and real property as described in <p of the Court's
Memorandum Decision. Thus, it is abundantly clear that the Court's reference to "paragraph 5(a)
of the respondent's proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" is a reference to ^5 of the
conclusions of law portion of the Respondent's proposed Findings & Conclusions.
When re-drafting and editing Ms. Schovaers' proposedfindingsas directed by the Court, counsel
for Ms. Schovaers had no difficulty linking the Court's reference to paragraph 5(a)" of
Respondent's proposed Findings & Conclusions to those provisions of Respondent's proposed
Findings & Conclusions that the Court wanted to utilize in allocating and dividing the parties'
house and real property.
Thus, it is abundantly clear that the Court did infeethave access to Respondent's

tjIr
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proposed Findings & Conclusions when it made its decision and rulings in this matter. Moreover,
^2 of the Court's Memorandum Decision show tkiLT nut only did -aej^oigtjbaye Respondent's
proposed Findings & Conclusions when making its decision, the Court actually used and adopted
some of the provisions from Respondent's proposed Findings and Conclusions in making its
decision in this matter. Since the basis for Respondent's Motions is without merit, the Court
should deny Respondent's Motions.
DL

THE COURT SHOULD DENY RESPONDENTS MOTIONS BECAUSE THE
COURT'S ALIMONY AWARD AND OTHfiR RULINGS ARE LEGAL AND
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
In his Motions, Respondent seeks a new trial and/or the amended of the judgment

pursuant to Rule 59(a)(6) and (7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Motions, p. 1. In
essence, Respondent claims that, since he only earns $4,300 per month, the Court's alimony
award of $2,000 per month is not adequately supported by the evidence and/or is illegal
Motions, p,3-7. Respondent's assertion in this regard fails to recognize and properly apply the
applicable binding case law and statutory provisions that relate to alimony awards.
In Utah divorce cases, trial courts must consider three factors before awarding alimony.
Those factors include: (1) thefinancialneeds and condition of the recipient spouse; (2) the ability
of the recipient spouse to provide a sufficient income for herself; and (3) the ability of the payor
spouse to provide support. E.g., Bakanowski v. Bakahowski 80 P.3d 153,155 (Ut. App. 2003).
Here, the Court adequately considered all of these factors in determining to award alimony of
$2,000 per month to Ms. Schovaers. Respondent now challenges the Court's alimony award and
argues that the alimony award is necessarily illegal and unjustified because $2,000 is not available

-4-

from the Respondent's monthly salary of $4,300.00 per month. Thus, the thrust of Respondent's
argument is that when looking solely at his employment income, Respondent does not have the
ability to provide support to Ms. Schovaers. Respondent's analysis and argument is flawed for
several reasons.
First, when determining whether a payor has the ability to pay alimony, the Court must
consider, not only the payor's income from employment, but allfinancialresources that the payor
can use to pay alimony, including the payor's separate property. E.g., Sampinos v. Sampinos,
750 P.2d 615,618-619 (Ut. App. 1988). Here, Respondent asks the Court to focus only on the
feet that his monthly income is $4,300 per month, and to completely ignore the fact that the
Respondent has significant otherfinancialresources from which he can pay alimony including:
hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of the Schovaers Electronics stock; hundreds of
thousands of dollars worth of retirement benefits; other property; as well as regular monetary gifts
and/or payments from parents. Respondent's argument that his ability to pay alimony should be
determined by considering only his $4,300 monthly employment income is contrary to Sampinos
v. Sampinos and all of the other Utah cases that instruct trial courts to consider, not only the
payor's income from employment, but the payor's totalfinancialcircumstances when determining
the proper amount of alimony awards. Here, it is clear that the Court properly considered the
Respondent's totalfinancialcircumstances when deciding its alimony award. Thus, in light of
Respondent's totalfinancialcircumstances, the alimony award is neither excessive or improper.
Next, even though the Court previously indicated that the Respondent had grossly
overstated his claimed expenses, Respondent continues to wilfully overstate his expenses in
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arguing that the alimony award is excessive. In particular, Anna, the parties' minor child is now
18 years old and will be fully emancipated in less than 4 months. Once Anna is fully emancipated,
Respondent's claimed expenses will be significantly reduced evenftirther.Anna's pending
emancipation and the feet that Respondent's claimed expenses would soon be reduced even
further was clearly considered and known to the Court both at the time of trial and when the
Court determined the appropriate amount alimony. Nevertheless, Respondent's Motions fail to
acknowledge or even acknowledge the feet that Respondent's claimed expenses will be
significantly reduced in less than 4 months. Thus, the Respondent's analysis and argument that
the alimony award is improper or excessive in light of his expenses isflawedand significantly
overstated.
Next, Respondent argues that the Court's alimony award is excessive and improper
because the $2,000 monthly alimony award does not equalize the parties' respective monthly
incomes, but instead puts the Respondent's net monthly income lower than Petitioner's. Motion,
p.6. The Respondent's argument in this regard is improper and misconstrues the case law
because the goal and purpose of alimony is not to equalize the parties' income. Instead, the
purpose and goal of alimony is to equalize the parties' standards of living and restore the payee as
close as possible to the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. E.g., Bakanowski v.
BakanowskL 80 P.3d 153,154 (Ut App. 2003) ("It is well within the Court's equitable powers to
order alimony in an amount sufficient to equalize the parties1 standards of living."); Williamson v.
Williamson. 983 P.2d 1103,1106 (Ut App. 1999) (4The goal of alimony [is] to equalize the
parties' standards of living, not just their incomes"). Here, the Court's alimony award properly
equalizes the parties' standards of living rather than their respective net monthly incomes. Any
assertion by the Respondent that the Court's alimony award must equalize the parties' incomes is
-6-

directly contrary to all cases dealing with the matter. Kg.. Kemp v. Kemp, 2001UT App 157
("We have never required [equalization] of income."
In light of the foregoing, it is apparent that the Court considered all of the factors its was
obligated to considered when deciding on the amount of alimony to award. The Court's alimony
award is both proper and reasonable in amount as it fairly equalizes the parties' standards of living
and returns Ms. Schovaers, as close as equitably possible, to the standard of living that she
enjoyed during the course of the parties' marriage. Furthermore, the Court considered
Respondent's totalfinancialcircumstances when determining his ability to pay support. Thus, the
Court's alimony award is both consistent with the law and adequately supported by the evidence.
Accordingly, Respondent's Motions should be denied.

Dated: Z>

04
Frank N. Call
Attorney for Petitioner, Josephine M. Schovaers
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PROOF OF SERVICE
I certify that on this JTH day of \1ZfflltJ&M
, 2004,1 caused a true and
accurate copy of the forgoing to be served on the persons listed below by mailing such copies by
U.S. First Class mail, postage pre-paid, to:
Bert L. Dart
Dart Adamson & Donovan
Attorney for John Schovaers
370 East South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

B.L. DART (818)
DART ADAMSON & DONOVAN
Attorney for Respondent
370 East South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)521-6383

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
---oooOOOooo—
JOSEPHINE M.SCHOVAERS,
Petitioner,
v.
JOHN C. SCHOVAERS,
Respondent

:

RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO
PETITIONER'S OPPOSITION TO
: RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO AMEND
FINDINGS, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
: & MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND
JUDGMENT
:
Civil No. 014903735
:
Judge Leslie Lewis
—oooOOOooo—

Respondent, John C. Schovaers, by bis attorney, B. L. Dart, replies to petitioner's
Opposition to respondent's Motion to Amend Findings, Motion for New Trial and Motion to
Alter or Amend Judgment as follows:
1.

Thefirstpoint of petitioner's Opposition is based upon the claim that the

Court must have had respondent's Findings of Fact when it made its ruling because in the
Memorandum Decision it referenced respondent's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The
problem is that the reference was to paragraph 5(a) of the proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and there, in fact, is no paragraph 5(a) to those proposed Findings. The only
paragraph 5(a) of respondent's pleadings is of the proposed Decree of Divorce. There is a
paragraph 5 of the Findings of Fact but it relates to monthly expenses, not to property.

Petitioner then contends that the reference by the court to paragraph 5(a)
was as to the property award and then goes on to say,
"Thus, it is abundantly clear that the court's reference to 'paragraph
5(a) of the respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law' is a reference to paragraph 5 of the Conclusions of Law
portion of the respondent's Proposed Findings and Conclusions."
This position makes no sense as the Memorandum Decision directed petitioner to "incorporate
paragraph 5(a) of the respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law."
Paragraph 5 of respondent's proposed Conclusions of Law states, "The property of the parties
shall be awarded set forth in paragraphs 14 and 15 of the Findings of Fact" It is difficult to see
how the Court would have asked petitioner to incorporate this language into his Findings of Fact
The language of the court directing petitioner to incorporate paragraph
5(a) of the respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law only makes sense
when it is applied to paragraph 5 of respondent's Proposed Decree of Divorce and this is why it is
submitted that the Court was relying upon respondent's Proposed Decree of Divorce and not his
Proposed Findings of Fact at the time it made its ruling.
It is clear the Court was looking at the respondent's Proposed Decree of
Divorce, which does not incorporate all of the bases for the various rulings and not respondent's
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which does incorporate the basis for the
proposed rulings, by looking at the languagefromthe Memorandum Decision that states,
"The petitioner filed her Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law on approximately September 16,2003. The respondent
submitted his Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on
approximately September 30,2003."
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As can be seenfromExhibits "A" and "IT attached to respondent's Motion, respondent's
Findings of Fact were delivered to the Court on the 12th of September, 2003. Respondent's
Proposed Decree of Divorce was delivered to the Court on the 30th day of September, 2003. It is
obvious the Court was looking at the Proposed Decree of Divorce.
Finally, petitioner claims that the Court must have had the respondent's
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law when making its decision as, "The court
actually used and adopted some of the provisionsfromrespondent's Proposed Findings and
Conclusions in making its decision in this matter," and references the Court to paragraph 2 of the
Memorandum Decision. There is nothing in paragraph 2 of the Memorandum Decision to
establish that the Court was looking at respondent's Proposed Findings as opposed to the
Proposed Decree of Divorce.
2.

The only cash flow available to respondent is his monthly salary which the

Court found to be $4,300 a month. Petitioner in her brief contends that in determining whether
respondent had the ability to pay alimony, the Court should consider not only his income from
employment but all financial resources that he could use to pay alimony, including his separate
property and cites the Court to the case of Sampinos v. Sampinos. 750 P.2d 615,618-619. The
Sampinos case is not applicable to the facts of this case as in the Sampinos case the Court found
that the plaintiflTwife,
"while married to defendant was forced to use her inheritance
proceedsfromthe sale of her home for support and maintenance,
a portion of which was used for defendant's benefit. We, therefore,
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding
plaintiff alimonyfromthe coal contract proceeds, even though the
trial court determined them to be defendant's sold and separate
property."
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In the Sampinos case the Court found that where plaintiffs non-marital assets had been used to
support defendant it was appropriate to use an income stream off of defendant's non-marital
assets to assist him in paying alimony. Those are not the facts of this case. No assets of
petitioner have been used to support respondent and respondent has no assets which provide an
income stream. The Schovaers Electronics stock which is referred to by petitioner has never paid
any dividends and does not provide any income stream to respondent.
Petitioner then claims that respondent has "hundreds of thousands of
dollars worth of retirement benefits" which he can look to in paying alimony, while disregarding
the fact that the retirement of the parties was divided equally between the parties and petitioner
has the same amount of funds from this source as does respondent Finally, petitioner mentions
that respondent has regular monetary giftsfromhis parents. Respondent testified that that gifting
from his parents had terminated based upon the changes of tax laws that allow larger estates to
pass free of inheritance taxes. More important, respondent's attorney has never known of a case
where a court has based alimony award on anticipated giftsfromthe payor's parents.
Petitioner then makes the argument that the goal of alimony is to equalize
the parties' standard of living not just their incomes and, in so doing, cites the Court to the case of
Williamson v. Williamson. 983 P.2d 1103 (Utah App. 1999). The Williamson case has no
application here. The Williamson case was a case where in a modification proceeding the trial
court terminated a $425 a month alimony award under circumstances that the husband's income
had been reducedfrom$3,550 a month at the time of the divorce to $2,090 a month at the time of
the modification hearing. The trial court ruling was reversed for failure of the trial court to
prepare sufficient Findings of Fact to support his ruling. The statement that the goal of alimony is
4

to equalize the parties' standard of living not just their incomes was in the context that the
husband had remarried. The Court in its opinion stated,
"When considering Ms. Williamson'sfinancialcondition
and earning capacity and Mr. Williamson's ability to give
support, the trial court should move beyond merely
considering their incomes and inquiry more fully into
their financial situations including Mr. Williamson's new
spouses financial ability to share living expenses with him."
In the Schovaers case it is difficult to see how the parties can have an equal
standard of living if they have a disparate level of income. The Memorandum Decision of the
Court unfortunately does create a disparate situation to Mrs. Schovaers's advantage and to Mr.
Schovaers's disadvantage. There was nothing in this case to indicate that petitioner's expenses
were higher than respondent's. In fact, the reverse is true.
Petitioner relies on the Kemp case to say that the Court has never required
equalization of income. In the Kemp case the Court determined that there was a $560 difference
between the wife's earning capacity and her reasonable expenses and, therefore, awarded $560 a
month in alimony. The wife, who was the recipient of alimony, was asking the Court to equalize
income under circumstances where all of her expenses had been covered under the alimony award.
An equalization of income would have created a cash flow to the wife in excess of her needs.
Under all of the circumstances of this case, the Court should modify its
award of alimony for the reasons set forth in respondent's Motion.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20th day o^Fe^ary, 2 0 0 / . / / /

B. L. DART
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I hereby certify that on the 20* day of February, 2004,1 mailed a copy of the
foregoing to:
Frank N. Call
Attorney for Petitioner
68 South Main Street, #701
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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